

Turkey

419. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Steps to Emphasize U.S. Interest in, and Friendship for, Turkey

At your request, we have reviewed a variety of suggestions and possibilities for emphasizing U.S. interest in, and friendship for, Turkey. While there are certain specific actions which I cite below, we will rely principally on patient and traditional diplomatic means in seeking to improve our relations with Turkey, including continued considerate and responsive attitudes toward Turkish interests, intensified efforts to solicit the Turks' views, and to engage their energies in as many common endeavors as possible.

More specifically, however, I submit the following thoughts:

1. The Turkish Ambassador has requested an agreement in principle to a visit by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to the United States in late November or early December of this year. You will soon be receiving recommendations for visits of various Chiefs of States; I will include a recommendation that you approve such a visit at a time mutually convenient to both governments. An early indication to the Turks of agreement in principle to such a visit is desirable.

2. The uncertainty concerning the U.S. Ambassadorship in Ankara, resulting from the withdrawal of Mr. Komer's nomination to the Senate,² should be resolved as soon as possible. I will be submitting recommendations to you at an early date.

3. We are working with the Defense Department to get from the Turks a decision to take over Cigli Air Base so that Defense can release as quickly as possible \$2.8 million to remove U.S. military headquarters facilities from the center of Ankara to the outskirts. The latter move is desired by both the Turks and ourselves and is designed primarily to reduce the visibility of the large U.S. presence in the capital.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL TUR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and cleared by Rockwell and Sisco.

² Komer, a non-career official, was serving on a recess appointment made by President Johnson on October 28, 1968; he presented his credentials on January 3, 1969.

4. The Turks were greatly moved by the flight of Apollo 8, and I am planning to include Turkey if there is another astronaut goodwill trip abroad.

5. The Turks are quite sensitive to Armenian efforts to keep alive the memory of the Armenian massacres in Turkey after the First World War. They have asked us to do what we can to convince the Congress not to pass the pending resolution to make April 24 "Armenian Martyrs Day."³ We will do our best in this regard.

6. The levels of military and economic assistance have a very direct and strong impact on our relations with Turkey. This will be a most important aspect of our current review of the over-all assistance programs.

7. I am seeing the Turkish Ambassador at his request this Thursday⁴ and will at that time personally stress our friendship and interest.

WPR

³ The resolution was not passed.

⁴ February 13; a memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70.

420. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 1, 1969, 4:40–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Turkish Prime Minister Calls on President

PARTICIPANTS

Turkish:

His Excellency Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister
 His Excellency Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister
 His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador

United States:

The President
 Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director, Turkish Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Cash on April 2. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

The President began by saying we were most honored that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had come for the funeral; General Eisenhower had had a warm spot in his heart for Turkey.²

The Prime Minister said the Turks had felt it their duty to pay their respects to a great man, who had served the entire free world. They were grateful the President had had time for this meeting, which was a good occasion for an exchange of views.

The President said a lot had happened, and the world had changed. One thing he wished the Turks to be aware of was that the US and Turkey were good friends, and his philosophy was not to take friends for granted. He knew the Turks had been required to face great risks with great courage and hoped the US could reciprocate. If the Turkish Government should ever feel that its relations with the US were not what they should be, the President hoped matters would be discussed at the ambassadorial level or at the top level.

The Prime Minister commented that as a matter of fact very good relations are maintained by the respective governments and people; he saw no reason why this should not continue, as he felt it to be beneficial to both countries. New conditions are being created all over the world, and new generations which have not known the sufferings of war want a better life. Today most countries desire peace wherever freedom of press, elections, and a multi-party system exist. One fact, however, should not be missed; international communism has not changed its objective, but merely its tactics.

These new tactics, the President commented, are more difficult to deal with than the old.

The Communists, the Prime Minister continued, now prefer to create problems inside developing countries taking advantage of the democratic system, itself, in order to undermine it. If a government tries to curb these efforts, there is a loud outcry. In such a situation, all democratic countries should stick together; things are not less difficult today than they were twenty years ago. For example, there is China, about which we know very little.

The President agreed saying it would be better if we knew more. Countries should cooperate in informing the public better. What, he asked, should we be doing about all this?

Development, Demirel responded emphatically, is the only way out. If this is successful, things will be fine; if not, we have problems. Turkey is a good example. The Turks will succeed and are grateful for what the US has done to help.

² Former President Eisenhower died March 28.

The President responded that the Turks had done a lot to help themselves.

Demirel said that in six or seven years Turkey hoped to be a contributing country.

The President asked whether there was time; young people today are very impatient.

There is no alternative, Demirel responded.

The President said he thought the Prime Minister's analysis was very perceptive. The world has indeed changed in the last twenty years, and Soviet tactics—but not objectives—have changed. However, Soviet needs have also changed. They now need friends in the West since they must watch both West and East. What would be the effect, the President asked, of possible US-USSR talks? As that kind of détente develops—if it does develop—is this going to weaken other countries' desire to remain strong?

The Prime Minister said he felt talks were fine but should be conducted carefully so as to avoid the possible danger the President had indicated, in order that other countries not lose confidence in the Alliance.

The President said he wanted to emphasize that the US is keenly aware of its responsibilities to have the fullest discussion with its friends in order to get their advice and suggestions, not just to inform them. US decisions vis-à-vis the Soviets will have an enormous effect in the US, but also on other countries counting on the US. Therefore, we think we have responsibilities going beyond just the US and the USSR, and we wish to have the closest of relations with the Turkish Government as we proceed.

The Prime Minister said his Government felt that all countries which believe in freedom should not create problems for their allies. Sometimes, however, this cannot be helped. During the last couple of years the Turks have developed better relations with the Soviets, but this has nothing to do with Turkish commitments to friends and allies. These will continue in the future.

The President said he thought Turkish interests were the same as US interests. The Soviet Union is Turkey's neighbor. There may be difficulties, but they can be discussed. The President said he had always believed in frank talks with the Soviets making clear that each had a different view of the world. Each had a right to such views, but both must try to reduce the risk of conflict over their differences. This, in the President's view, was what the Turks were doing.

The President mentioned that Iran was acting similarly.

The Prime Minister commented that Iran and Turkey have good relations and are both members of CENTO, but the latter organization is not as strong as it once was.

In response to the President's request for advice on the Middle East, the Prime Minister said the President was, of course, aware of the situation in the Mediterranean and the Soviet presence. Syria is becoming worse and worse. Turkey is trying to keep Iraq from developing in this direction. Middle East crises should not become international crises; they should be settled locally. Both sides, including the Arabs, should be listened to and understood. Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories. It is difficult for one Arab nation to begin talks alone. Pressure must be put on both sides.

While the UN can serve as the locus of a settlement, it cannot settle the problem.

In response to the President's question about the situation in Egypt, the Prime Minister commented that the UAR is wholly dependent on the Soviets.

The meeting concluded at 5:10 P.M. with the Prime Minister saying that Turkey and the US are good friends and allies, and the President saying we hope to keep it that way.

421. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1969, 5:35–6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Call of Turkish Minister of Defense Ahmet Topaloglu on Secretary Laird

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey Side

Minister of Defense—Ahmet Topaloglu

Assistant Secretary General for International Security Affairs—Sukru Elekdag
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Assistant Director General, NATO Department—Muammer Akcer (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs)

United States Side

Secretary of Defense—Melvin Laird

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter

Director, Near East and South Asia Region (ISA)—Brigadier General
John W. Baer

Country Director for Turkey, NESAs Region (ISA)—Captain Edward C. Krebs

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, Turkey 333–, 1969. Confidential. Drafted on April 11 by Krebs and approved by Nutter. The meeting took place in Secretary Laird's office.

The conversation opened with an exchange of pleasantries during which the MOD and the Secretary noted their common background as politicians. Secretary Laird remarked that as early as 1954 he had visited Adana and had had the opportunity to travel through the political district from which Minister Topaloglu was elected that year. The Minister said that he hoped the Secretary would have another opportunity to visit Turkey.

Minister Topaloglu then changed the subject to military assistance. Noting that the US, over a period of 20 years, had given Turkey military aid in the amount of 2.5 billion dollars, he wished on behalf of his countrymen to thank the US for this assistance. He also wished, however, to explain the current situation in view of Turkey's importance on the southeastern flank of NATO. Secretary Laird replied that he had great respect for the Turkish armed forces. He had watched them train and knew they were good. He had also inspected some of their port and military facilities and knew how important they were.

The Minister said he appreciated the Secretary's awareness, and believed that what was needed at present was an examination of the extent the Turkish armed forces had been improved by US aid and what more needed to be done to improve them in the face of the current threat—a threat that was not Turkey's alone but of all of the allies. He went on to say that the aid which had been given through 1966 had averaged \$144 million a year and had been given to the armed forces in general. Since 1966, however, US military assistance had been based on a five year program and fixed force goals for the Turkish armed forces. To achieve this program, a decision taken in the US Senate set the aid level at \$134 million a year. This was determined to be the minimum level to achieve the NATO Bravo force goals established at that time.

The Minister then said that since these decisions had been taken some important changes have taken place: 1) the situation in the Middle East has become worse; 2) the USSR naval forces in the Mediterranean have become a threat; and 3) the hope of NATO that we could reach a *détente* with Russia has been dashed with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, when NATO met last fall, it was decided that member countries should do more to meet the new situation. In the NATO meeting of last January it was agreed that NATO members who could not meet their goals and who were receiving assistance should get more aid. In spite of this, US military assistance to Turkey dropped to about \$95–97 million, while costs of equipment rose very sharply.

Minister Topaloglu next pointed out that, while Turkey understood the US situation with respect to Vietnam, the US balance of payments problem, and US efforts to protect her allies over the past 20 years, the US had taken on herself the leadership to protect the West and western

ideals. She must, therefore, understand the position and difficulties of her allies. He went on to say that when he attended his first NATO meeting in 1966 he was surprised to hear that most Ministers of Defense spoke more like Finance Ministers than Defense Ministers. Their talk was always of curtailing expenditures. Now, while Turkey does not expect the US to impose more taxes to defend NATO and Europe, there remains the common problem of protecting the peace. Turkey intends to cooperate with the US towards this aim.

The Minister next focused on the situation on the southeastern flank of NATO. He pointed out that Turkey has fought more wars with Russia and knows Russia better than other NATO countries. He likened Turkey to a “rock” which prevents Russian encroachment into the Middle East and Africa. Whether Turkey receives aid or not, it intends to preserve itself as a “rock,” as it has done for centuries. Since the US has taken steps to prevent the expansion of communism into SE Asia, it is aware that the next area for communist expansion is the Middle East and Africa. Turkey is sure the US is going to prevent this, but if Turkey does not receive external assistance now it will be too late later on for Turkey to assist in this task. The MOD then said he had some constructive suggestions to make in this respect:

1. During the visit of the late Mr. McNaughton, the US and Turkey had agreed that a proper level of military assistance should be about \$134 million a year.² We do not want more but only that which we had agreed upon. This level should be resumed.

2. Bring down the price of military equipment. This would not involve the Senate but lies within the power of the Administration.

Minister Topaloglu next presented a memorandum which he explained set forth the condition of the Turkish armed forces following curtailment of military assistance and some suggestions for improving this condition. He highlighted these suggestions by stressing the need for Fletcher class destroyers and Guppy II-A submarines, accelerated supply of F-100 A/C to replace obsolescent F-84s, and faster delivery of heavy vehicles and equipment for the ground forces. Referring to the policy of flexible response, the MOD spoke of the Bulgarian and Russian capability to attack without warning as underscoring the need to improve and make ready the Turkish armed forces.

² Force goals for the Turkish armed forces were agreed upon between the United States and Turkey. According to an undated memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations: “The goals were originally proposed by Assistant Secretary McNaughton to the Greek and Turkish MODs in February 1966. This policy was not announced to NATO but was treated as a bilateral matter between the US . . . and Turkey.” (Ibid., FRC 330 75-0125, Turkey 000.1-333, 1971) Documentation on the McNaughton goals is *ibid.*, FRC 330 75-0009, Turkey—McNaughton)

In concluding his remarks, the Defense Minister said that while he is convinced the US will never leave Turkey alone and defenseless, he felt it was his duty to inform Secretary Laird of the weaknesses of the Turkish armed forces. He then noted that the US had the means to implement the program agreed upon over two years ago, and if implemented it would eliminate many hardships.

Secretary Laird thanked the Minister for his frank remarks on the Turkish armed forces. He said that the new administration was reviewing the worldwide military situation and that this review encompassed not only our own forces but our military assistance programs as well. He added that our commitment in Vietnam certainly gave us problems. Nevertheless, President Nixon, by his trip to Europe, has shown that he is interested in improving and strengthening the NATO alliance. Secretary Laird went on to say that we realize how important it is to maintain our force levels in Europe, and President Nixon has made it plain that these will depend on security requirements rather than financial hardships.

Making reference to the memorandum the MOD had submitted, Secretary Laird said he was interested in the remarks the Minister had made concerning the Navy and Air Force and that we would look into them. He continued by saying we have not finalized our military assistance programs and we recognize your needs as important not only to Turkey but to NATO as a whole. Secretary Laird completed his remarks by saying that Congressmen often asked whether US aid did not permit the recipient to do less. In the case of Turkey he knew this was not the case.

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 7, 1969, 1546Z.

3068. For President and Secretary from Komer.

1. On leaving Turkey after an active five-month tour, I wish to report on what I regard as the quite unsatisfactory state of our relations with a key ally, and offer my final recommendations for repairing them.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Secret; Limdis.

2. Few would deny that Turkey is very important to us. Moreover, a review of the record shows that my predecessors and I have repeatedly warned of the gradual erosion of our position here and the growth of anti-American sentiment. See for example my 1116 of 19 Feb 1969.² But somehow, amid the press of other business, the US has been slow to react with policies and programs commensurate to the need.

3. The problem here is not just one of US-Turk relations, but of Turkey's whole westward orientation, which in turn plays a key role in the stability of its democratic regime. For unless Turkey gradually joins Europe, it will probably not be able to solve its deep-rooted economic and social problems within a democratic frame. Since the 1960 revolution successive Turkish Governments and Turkey's politically articulate minority have been reappraising Turkey's role in the world and its alliances, in which the US plays by far the largest part. The main conclusions they appear to have reached are that (a) Turkey's interests require substantial improvement of relations with the Soviet and Arab blocs; (b) sharp cuts in US military and economic aid represent loss of US interest in Turkey; (c) the present size and scope of US activity may harm rather than contribute to Turkey's security, and (d) the US cannot be relied on to support an acceptable resolution of the Cyprus issue or even to come to Turkey's aid in event of war.

4. Despite all these reservations, most Turks still believe that Turkey has no realistic alternative but to rely on the NATO umbrella to protect it against unpredictable Soviet pressures. But the fact that most Turks, and above all the GOT itself, are still pro-US and pro-NATO should not blind us to the forces at work beneath the surface. Though still quantitatively small, they are qualitatively more significant among the press, students, and the educated elite.

5. Turkey's growing reservations about the West have combined with the democratic freedoms established under the 1961 constitution to stimulate a revival of Turk xenophobia. This has provided the far left with a highly favorable environment for attacking not only the American presence but also all Turkish institutions, including the present regime, whose policies support a continuing close alignment with the West. Even the EEC is now under attack. Growing reservations among the Turkish public, and even many soldiers and officials, about the efficacy and value of this alignment have placed both us and the Turks who support us increasingly on the defensive. Particularly worrisome is the likely leftward swing in the chief opposition party after Inonu.

6. To counter this trend and preserve our fundamental interests, I see two major lines of action as required. The first is actively to counter

² Not printed. (Ibid.)

the extremist anti-Western campaign through a comprehensive program to expose its distorted propaganda, set the record straight on our own activities, propagandize the continuing advantages to Turkey of its cultural, economic, and mutual security associations with the US and the West, and finally to remind the Turkish public constantly but subtly of the risks of drifting into neutralism. In short, we must deny to the Turkish left its enormous advantage in holding the initiative in the propaganda battle. Many will say that this is the GOT's job, not ours. But unless we show the way their own efforts will remain half-hearted and, if past experience is any guide, largely ineffective.

7. I believe that we have made significant progress in this area during the five months I have been in Turkey. A purposeful Mission effort to refute lies, correct distortions, and describe the truth about the American presence has made the far left's propagandists aware that they can no longer peddle their wares with impunity. The Turkish press now presents at least a somewhat more balanced picture than it did five months ago, and the irresponsibility of the extreme left publicists has been made more apparent. For example, the public now accepts about 20,000 as the number of Americans in Turkey, whereas a few months ago auditors were citing figures of 36,000 and 48,000. Contributing to an improved US image have been our readiness to reconsider 6th Fleet visits before the October elections and to reduce the highly visible US military presence especially in urban areas. But a great deal more can and must be done. I urgently recommend that our information and political action efforts be sharply stepped up.

8. Second, we must readjust our policies and programs to the changes in Turkish attitudes. By concentrating on preserving those elements of our relationship which are essential to our [garble] and modifying all other elements to meet the insistent Turkish demand for a sense of greater independence, we can save money to boot. Highest priority should go to restoring Turkey's faith in the US as its chief ally. To achieve this in the current environment of growing scepticism about American purposes requires, in my judgment, three major policy adjustments:

A. Prompt conclusion of a revised bilateral agreement³ sufficiently favorable to Turkey to credibly symbolize a new relationship. This matter has become urgent, and if we fail to complete the job before the Turk Parliament adjourns in three weeks, we will have lost a major political opportunity.

³ Apparent reference to the U.S.-Turkish Bilateral Cooperation Agreement, signed March 5, 1959. (10 UST 320)

B. Restoration of military aid to something more like the McNaughton level of \$134 million.⁴ However understandable, past sharp cuts have seriously weakened Turkey's military posture and had a sharply adverse psychological impact.

C. Reduction of our own military presence to the minimum required by our strategic interests. Over the past few years we have closed down three [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facilities and plan to eliminate two more. We expect to vacate one of our two air bases. Reductions have been made, and others planned, in our military support facilities, but these are occurring too slowly and without adequate prior consultation with the GOT. I am convinced that most of our military functions here could—with American guidance, training and technical support—be gradually assumed by Turks. At a minimum let us aim toward eliminating US-exclusive installations and paring down the ubiquitous support structure which is primarily responsible for our "visibility" problem. Next to restoring military aid levels, nothing would help more than to urge that Turkey gradually assume the military [*less than 1 line not declassified*] missions which we now carry out ourselves. Even for those limited operations which for security or technical reasons must remain under US control, we should accept (as we have in other countries) "cover" arrangements provided by the host government. Not only are the advantages to our balance of payments and image in Turkey obvious, but we will end up sooner or later having to do this anyway. Why not gain from doing it faster now?

9. Finally, the Cyprus issue remains a major contribution to the deterioration of US-Turkish relations and could again seriously damage our position here. More than likely, at some time in the next year or two the US will again have to decide whether or not to throw its power and prestige into the scales of a solution. In approaching such a decision we must recognize that failure to intervene, or intervention that appears to Turkey to be in favor of the Greeks, could seriously risk losing Turkey as an ally. It may be parochial to say so, but I fear that we have based our Cyprus policy more on the concept of Greek majority rule than on our strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

10. I have addressed this final dispatch to you, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary, because I have learned from over ten years of high policy experience that one of the great flaws of our system is the failure to flush up emerging major problems to the top level until they have reached the flash point. Turkey is as yet far from that point, but the trend is sufficiently adverse that more aggressive skillful preventive

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 421.

medicine is needed now. If we play our cards right, we can retain an effective ally. If not, I predict a continued erosion of Turkey's westward orientation. I would not be surprised to see a neutralist Turkey within five-seven years.

Komer

423. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS 314/07360-69

Washington, May 19, 1969.

COUNTRY

Turkey

DOI

16-18 May 1969

SUBJECT

Turkish Military Plans To Assume Control of Government

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[4 lines not declassified]

1. Following several days of meetings with various political figures and deliberation within the Turkish General Staff (TGS), the military establishment reached a final decision on the night of 16 May concerning the proposed legislation which would restore political rights of Celal Bayar and other discredited politicians and amend the constitution.² This decision is to assume control of the Government of Turkey if, the Senate passes the legislation at its scheduled meeting on 20 May. President Sunay has been consulted and is a party to this action.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

² The 1961 constitution banned Beyer and a number of other politicians associated with the suppressed Democratic Party. Legislation to amend the constitution and permit them full citizenship rights had support in both of Turkey's major parties. The Embassy analyzed political alignments within the Turkish Parliament in telegram 3619 from Ankara, May 19. (Ibid., Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969)

2. The TGS, under the signature of General Tagmac, has notified all army, corps and division commanders by secret order of the military's intention. Appropriate air force and naval commands also have been notified. The military would act on the night of 20/21 May, notifying the nation by Turkish Radio probably during a regular newscast, of the military's action.

3. In the meantime, the military has let all political leaders, including Prime Minister Demirel, know that it intends to take this action and has been especially active in working on the Senate and individual Senators. TGS already has been given assurances by Republican People's Party (RPP) Senator Hifzi Oguz Bekata and RPP Deputy Kenal Satir that the RPP will vote against the bill in the Senate thus denying the 2/3 vote necessary. The military has a number of intelligence officers in civilian clothing hounding Senators of all political persuasions and is predicting that it will be very difficult to raise a quorum in the Senate in the near future. The military believes that the Senate will effectively kill the action and that they will not have to act. If, by chance, the law passes despite everything, the military will act—their warning and preparations are not merely bluff.

4. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* There is no doubt that the military is greatly agitated by the present situation. Their wrath is directed primarily at RPP President General Ismet Inonu, and amazingly Prime Minister Demirel has not been greatly abused in the proceedings. A military take-over probably would entail only dissolving Parliament, but leaving Sunay in office and permitting Demirel and the cabinet to remain as caretakers until elections can be held. There is no apparent intention to make military control a long-term thing, although any ensuing election campaign probably would be more curtailed and more "dignified." The military only wants to put across the message that "its" constitution cannot be tampered with.)

5. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* President Sunay delivered his 19 May holiday message on Turkish Radio and released it in time for publication in morning papers. In his message he noted that "there is no scope for change in the constitution." There has been some rumor Sunay might use his authority to dissolve Parliament and order elections within 60 days in order to circumvent Senate vote.)

6. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

424. National Security Study Memorandum 75¹

Washington, September 23, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Program Analysis of Turkey

The President has directed that a program analysis of Turkey be undertaken in accordance with the procedures described in NSDM 4.²

The study will:

1. Analyze U.S. programs in Turkey and evaluate their contribution to the achievement of U.S. policy objectives.
2. Prepare a statement of the key policy and program alternatives with their rationales for consideration by the National Security Council.

The study should analyze U.S. policies and programs in Turkey including:

1. Military assistance and the development of Turkish armed forces.
2. Economic assistance and Turkey's social and economic development.
3. Requirements for U.S. personnel and bases in Turkey and their effect on U.S./Turkish relations.
4. U.S. military forces required to support Turkey and the Southern flank of NATO.
5. U.S. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] related to Turkey.
6. The programs of the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of Agriculture.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-218, NSSM 75. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² NSDM 4, "Program Analysis Studies," called for program analysis of various countries and regions to be performed by ad hoc interagency groups. The NSDM was originally issued on January 20 and was revised on September 4. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Documents 13 and 71.

The study will be performed by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by the Department of State. The members of the group will be designated by the addressee agencies.³

The Department of State will provide administrative support for the Ad Hoc Group.

The study should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by December 1, 1969. Subsequently, the study will be referred to the NSC IG/NESA for comment prior to consideration by the Review Group.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

³ In a September 30 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird objected to the original sentence that read: "Members of the group will be chosen from the addressee agencies by the Chairman." Laird preferred to retain the option to choose his designate to the ad hoc group. The sentence was changed on October 11 to accommodate Laird. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-218, NSSM 75)

⁴ The study was prepared but was not reviewed by the Review Group and no action was taken on it. (Ibid., Box H-162, NSSM 75)

425. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Narcotic Imports from Turkey

Pursuant to discussion at our meeting of December 4² on narcotics, I have now thoroughly discussed the Turkish situation with Ambassador Handley, and there is enclosed a proposed plan of action³ prepared by Mr. Harry Schwartz, Chairman of the Working Group.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969. Secret. A copy was sent to all members of the Narcotics Task Force.

² No record of the meeting was found.

³ Attached but not printed.

Briefly, I suggest that on his return to Turkey Ambassador Handley make a renewed effort to obtain Demirel's agreement to plow under the present crop. To strengthen his hand on this, we have worked out with AID authority for Handley to make a firm offer of a \$5 million grant-financed commodity import program to help the Turkish Government pay for plowing under the crop. Ambassador Handley's hand will, of course, be greatly strengthened by his ability to say that the President has personally discussed this matter with him. Additionally, in view of our inability to work out a Washington visit for Demirel until the middle of next year, it would be a dramatic and most forceful back-up to our efforts in Ankara, if the President were to call in the Turkish Ambassador here directly to express to him the President's concern over the situation.

If the foregoing course of action is not successful, we should seek to have the Turkish Government agree that all opium poppy crops after the 1970 crops are illegal and have legal purchases by U.S. pharmaceutical firms from the 1970 crops increased to a level sufficient to siphon the entire Turkish crop into legal channels. It is understood from BNDD that our pharmaceutical firms would be willing to do this and that it would not involve any outlay of U.S. Government funds. There is, of course, no guarantee that some Turkish opium would nevertheless find its way into illicit channels; but it is estimated that the amount should be about one-fourth of the previous level.

If neither of the foregoing courses of action are successful, we shall then need to reconsider the whole situation.

In the meantime, we have, through the French Embassy here, requested that the French Government support all efforts that we are making with the Government of Turkey.

Jack Ingersoll, who is in Paris, has not seen the attached. You may wish to get his reaction when he returns on December 15.

UAJ

426. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Opium Production in Turkey

Ambassador Handley's visit with you on December 22² will undoubtedly assist him in his efforts to convince the Turkish Government to destroy the 1970 poppy crop prior to harvest in the spring. If this effort is not successful, as may be likely, our fallback position is to arrange for an increased legal purchase of the 1970 crop and thereby reduce by 75% the amount of opium finding its way into the illegal traffic. This pre-emptive purchase scheme would be coupled with an effort to get the Turkish Government to make poppy planting illegal following the 1970 crop.

Under Secretary Johnson has recommended that you call in the Turkish Ambassador directly to express your concern over the harmful effects of the Turkish opium production. He suggests that this would be dramatic and forceful support to our other efforts.³

While such an action would add a dramatic touch, it seems to me that it might engage your prestige too much, particularly since there is little likelihood of the Turks agreeing to destroy the present crop. It might be better for you to consider calling in the Turkish Ambassador after we have received the Prime Minister's response to Ambassador Handley's next approach. At that time the impact of receiving the Turkish Ambassador would increase the chances of the Turks accepting our fallback position.

Recommendations

- 1) That you approve the game plan described in the first paragraph.

Approve

Disapprove

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969. Confidential. Sent for action. Sonnenfeldt sent this memorandum to Kissinger on December 22 under cover of a memorandum recommending that he sign it and send it to the President. Kissinger wrote on Sonnenfeldt's covering memorandum: "1. Calling on Amb is tactical issue. 2. Getting Pres to support heroin game plan is [illegible—policy?]. Do to-day—Dec. 26." Haig wrote the following on the top of the page: "Retype memo to Johnson but move memo to Pres." There was a note indicating that it was "done."

² See Document 427.

³ See Document 425.

2) That you call in the Turkish Ambassador *after*⁴ we have received the Prime Minister's response.⁵

Approve

Disapprove

Prefer to see the Turkish Ambassador now

⁴ The President circled "after" and checked the approval option.

⁵ On January 7, 1970, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Johnson stating that the President agreed with Johnson's suggestion that Handley "make a renewed effort to obtain the Prime Minister's agreement to destroy the present crop" and offer \$5 million assistance to help the Turkish Government plow under the crop. If that was not successful, Kissinger agreed that "we seek to increase legal purchases of the 1970 crop coupled with an agreement by the Turkish Government to stop poppy production after the 1970 crop." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969)

427. Memorandum From Egil Krogh, Jr. to Frank Cash¹

Washington, December 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Ambassador Handley with Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan and Egil Krogh

The President indicated his support for maintaining close, friendly relations with the Government of Turkey. The President and Ambassador Handley both emphasized the "gutsy" nature of the Turks' support in the Middle East.

Ambassador Handley reported that in his judgment, the Turkish Government have "pulled up their socks" in an effort to cooperate with the President's deep concern about the drug problem. Handley mentioned to the President that this visit would help him considerably when he goes back to discuss the question with Prime Minister Demirel.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Erlichman, Patrick Moynihan, and Arthur Downey of the White House staff and Harry Schwartz (S/NM).

² Not attached.

³ The astronauts visited Turkey October 20–21.

The President advised Ambassador Handley to tell Prime Minister Demirel that he is looking forward to a visit with the Prime Minister next year. The President indicated that the date would be somewhere between June and October of next year, but that he is not certain about what dates are available. Ambassador Handley stated that he felt Turkey would welcome a visit by the President if he could make it.

The President gave a clipping from *The New York Times* dated December 22, 1969 to Ambassador Handley for transmittal to Prime Minister Demirel from the President. A copy of this clipping is attached.²

Ambassador Handley reported in response to the President's question that the Astronauts were extremely well-received in Turkey.³ Handley mentioned some of the minor problems with Sixth Fleet visits in Turkey, but this was low-keyed.

Egil Krogh, Jr.⁴

Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

428. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 29.2-70

Washington, February 3, 1970.

TURKEY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

Note

This estimate assesses likely developments in respect of Turkey through the mid-1970s, with particular attention to Turkey's international relationships.

Conclusions

A. [2½ lines not declassified] The government will be concerned primarily with trying to improve living conditions and also with tackling

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R1012A, NIEs and SNIIEs. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted it with the concurrence of all members of the USIB, except the representatives of FBI and AEC who abstained on the grounds it was outside their jurisdiction.

fundamental economic problems. Turkey's economy is basically sound, but Turkey will continue to have a substantial trade deficit and, for several years at least, will need more foreign aid than it appears likely to get, if it is to maintain recent growth rates. [2½ lines not declassified] Direct military intervention in political affairs is, however, unlikely.

B. Turkey retains its historic suspicion of Russian designs against the Straits and rates highly its continued membership in NATO. At the same time, the Turks, like other NATO members, want more independence in foreign policy and will move toward better relations with Moscow. Nonetheless, Turkish-Soviet relations will be far short of warmth, and the Turks will take care to restrict Soviet presence and influence in Turkey.

C. Turkey will remain a useful ally of the US for the period of this estimate and probably for much longer, but it will have at least some ideas which are not in harmony with US views. The Turks want US forces to stay in Turkey but are concerned about the visibility of these forces. US-Turkish relations will depend in considerable part on questions of US economic and especially military aid, discussed in paragraphs 29–32.

Discussion

[Omitted here are sections I. "Introduction" and II. "The Domestic Scene."]

III. Turkey's International Position

20. Turkey's westward orientation reached its peak in the 1950s when Turkey became uniquely committed to a special bilateral relationship with the US within the framework of NATO membership. Ankara adopted this policy in response to a number of aggressive moves in Turkey's vicinity after World War II—the communist rebellion in Greece, Moscow's attempt to establish a Soviet Republic in Azerbaijan, and the USSR's demand that Turkey give Russia a predominant role in the Straits and hand back the border districts of Kars and Ardahan, whose return to Turkey had been conceded by the Bolsheviks in 1921. In these circumstances, alliance with the US and West European states appealed to most Turks, especially to the Menderes regime and to the military leadership, and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Even then, there were some critics of Turkey's move to a foreign policy substantially different from that of earlier years.

Changing Attitudes

21. For some years, growing numbers of Turks have come to feel that Turkey needed more flexibility in its foreign relations and have increasingly questioned the value of a foreign policy exclusively tied to the US and NATO. These views were influenced by similar earlier shifts

in opinions in Europe on the major issues concerning relations among Europe, the US, and the USSR. In the mid-1960s, Turkey's feeling of isolation over the Cyprus dispute further strengthened these sentiments, which have gradually had their effect on the attitude of the Turkish Government itself. Although Menderes entertained the idea of improving relations with the USSR, changes in Turkish Government foreign policy had to wait for the termination of the military takeover which ended the Menderes regime and for the improving atmosphere of East-West relations of the early 1960s.

22. Turkey is certainly not about to leave NATO. Its civilian leaders—in government, the business community, and intellectual circles—are too oriented toward the cultural, political, and social values of European and Atlantic society. Its material interests are with Western Europe and North America; 75 percent of its yearly trade, \$3.5 billion of economic aid over the past two decades, and all its foreign military supplies come from its NATO allies. Turkey's military leaders are even more disposed in these directions than their civilian counterparts. Stalin's hard-line pressure tactics of 1943–1953, though quickly and clearly repudiated by his successors, reinforced persistent Turkish feeling that the Czarist dream of controlling the Straits remains Russia's goal.

23. Both the JP and the RPP consider that some loosening of relations within the Atlantic Alliance is desirable, that Turkey should have a larger voice within the alliance, and that a better relationship with the USSR is in Turkey's interests. The RPP—partly because it is not in office—is generally more disposed to these views than the JP. While many factors have entered into the changes in Turkish government policy, the principal catalyst was the Cyprus crisis which began at the end of 1963. Turkish opinion was shocked by what it considered a US failure to support an ally. Moreover, in 1964 Turks generally were gravely affronted by what they considered an unnecessarily harsh letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu. This letter,² which became widely known in the country, implied that the US would withhold support for Turkey—even if Turkey were attacked by the Soviets as a result of an action such as a military intervention on Cyprus. Then in 1965, the USSR, after initially favoring the Greek Cypriot position, came out in support of the separate identity of the Turkish Cypriot community—a position close to Ankara's and one which Moscow still holds.

The USSR

24. The warming trend in Turkish-Soviet relations is likely to continue in several fields. Once most of the presently planned Soviet-

² *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 54.

supported projects are well under way, there almost certainly will be more such offers by Moscow. Visits back and forth by high officials will become more commonplace. Official Turkish policy stresses strict compliance with the terms of the Montreux Convention governing use of the Turkish Straits by the Soviets, but the Turks will continue to permit minor infringements in the interest of the new Soviet-Turkish relationship. Yet all this is likely to be carefully controlled and kept within bounds by Ankara. Turks going to the USSR will continue to be screened as to membership and limited as to type—e.g., civil servants rather than independent trade unionists. Ankara is not about to give the Soviets free run of the Straits and will on occasion remind Moscow of Turkey's sovereign rights by strictly enforcing regulations concerning transit. Within limits, the Turks will want the US periodically to show its flag in the Black Sea, but they will probably be more sensitive to US activities there which they think would seriously offend Moscow. In sum, the prospect is for a growing regularization of Turkish-Soviet relations, but one which falls far short of warmth and cordiality and which will limit Soviet access to Turkey.

25. It is probable that any attack on Turkey by a member of the Warsaw Pact would be made only as part of an overall assault against NATO. In conventional warfare, Turkey is capable of fighting a limited delaying action (approximately one week) against Warsaw Pact forces in European Thrace but could not hold out longer without outside assistance. A simultaneous attack in Eastern Turkey could be contained for a longer period, but Turkey soon would need outside assistance in this area as well. The Turkish Army is well aware of its deficiencies vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact powers and will continue to urge that Turkey be given the equipment necessary to counter such an attack.

The Middle East

26. Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors are likely to become more complex than the kind of "either friend or enemy" approach which once characterized Turkish attitudes in the area. Turkey does not have the worries about enemies in this area which impel the Shah of Iran to seek allies. Though CENTO still exists as a defense pact, the defense aspect is much less important to Turkey than commercial and communication links with Iran and Pakistan. Turkish-Israeli relations are good and likely to remain so, but Ankara will see no particular benefit in closer relations with Israel at the expense of impairing its efforts to improve relations with Arab states.

27. [1½ lines not declassified] Ankara has more comfortable relations with conservative Near Eastern states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia than with Syria and Iraq. It dislikes the radicalism of government in the latter states but does not believe they constitute a threat to Turkey itself. Turkish relations with Egypt have been untroubled but fairly

distant since the breakup of the UAR in 1961. Turkey will probably continue low key political and economic ties with its Arab neighbors, but will seek to avoid too close an involvement in inter-Arab affairs. It will probably continue recent moves to improve ties with the four North African Arab states.

Turkey and the US

28. The process of modifying the relationship between the US and Turkey inevitably involves strains. Difficulties between the two countries do not arise from differing assessments of the USSR's long-term policies and intentions. Rather they arise out of differing views about the current usefulness of various aspects of the alliance. The Turks value the presence of US forces on Turkish soil. There are, however, about 18,000 US military personnel and dependents in the country, mostly in or near the major cities, and the Turks are concerned about the visibility of these forces. For similar psychological and domestic political reasons, Turkey wishes to create some national forces which would not be committed to NATO. Nevertheless, for most purposes, e.g., defense of the Straits, the mission of national and NATO-committed forces would be identical.

29. Another major factor in the Turkish-US relationships is the question of economic and military aid. Since 1948, the US has provided Turkey with about \$3 billion in grant military aid and some \$2.5 billion in economic aid. While annual amounts have declined in recent years, US aid is still very important, both in itself and as a stimulant to OECD donors. The Turkish Government resents advice by US and other aid donors to the effect that drastic economic reforms in the fields of taxation and industrial efficiency are at least as important for rapid economic progress as is aid. [2 lines not declassified]

30. In 1966, the US undertook, subject to Congressional action, to provide \$670 million of military aid over the period 1967–1971, an annual average of \$134 million. This amount (the so-called McNaughton level) was considerably less than the Turkish military establishment desired. The Turkish military leaders, however, accepted—with some doubts—the argument that Turkey's allies would quickly come to its aid in a time of crisis. But the McNaughton level was met only in the first year; in 1968 and in 1969 MAP was only about \$100 million. The Turks have accepted the exigencies of the Vietnam situation as a reason for this decline, but they expect the gaps to be made up when possible. Even if new aid levels included making up shortfalls, however, the Turkish military establishment would continue to feel that it lacked sufficient modern equipment.

31. It is in part US military aid that induces the Turks to accept the present visibility of the US military presence. A substantial drop in military aid would generate fairly widespread resentment within the Turk-

ish Armed Forces. [3 lines not declassified] A return to something like the McNaughton levels would probably prevent this eventuality and make it easier to deal with the Turkish Government. Turkish dissatisfaction might also be mitigated to a degree by increased arms sales on concessionary terms. Even such sales would, however, add to Turkey's already large foreign debt burden. A drop of a few million dollars from the current aid level would probably not have much impact. However, a drop of tens of millions would not only affect military relationships but would also cause political friction in Turkey's relations with the US, though the level of such friction would probably be about the same whether the cut were 20 or 40 million. Except in the case of a virtual cessation of MAP, however, there is almost no possibility of complete termination or interdiction of US activities.

32. Large reductions in US military aid would also affect economic and political affairs within Turkey. The military establishment would be inclined to press the government for funds to purchase military equipment abroad. With a tight foreign exchange situation, the administration would face the unpleasant alternatives of reducing imports needed for the economy or of rebuffing the military. Military leaders would probably regard a large drop in US aid as at least partly stemming from JP failures in conducting relations with the US. [2 lines not declassified]

33. Despite these negative aspects, Turkey will remain a committed member of NATO and a useful ally of the US for the period of this estimate and probably for much longer. Far more than in the past, however, it will be an ally with ideas of its own, some of which will not be in harmony with US views. For example, Turkey would be unlikely to assent to US use of bases in Turkey to support military operations in the Middle East. Ankara will pursue the path of regularizing relations with the USSR. It will continue to seek improvement of relations with countries in the Mediterranean area, such as the Arab states on the North African coast, and in time probably with other countries in Asia and Africa. Turkey will probably seek commercial markets in such areas for goods it cannot sell in the EEC market. In the next five years at least, these steps will be limited.

IV. Cyprus—The Troublesome Contingency

34. The foregoing estimate is in many respects reassuring. One issue which could radically alter much of the outlook for Turkish foreign affairs is Cyprus. Since the last flareup of hostilities between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island at the end of 1967, matters have been fairly quiet. The present Greek Government has not supported the union of Cyprus with Greece, and almost all of the Greek illegal armed force left the island early in 1968. Representatives of the two communities have been engaged for 18 months in talks designed

to explore means of constructing a new political order in Cyprus. Some progress has been made, but the chief contribution of the talks has been to damp down tensions between the two communities by giving a sense of hope that some non-violent solution may in time be reached. Yet Greek and Turk on Cyprus are still far apart.

35. There is an outside chance that the talks between the two communities will achieve enough progress on marginal issues to permit movement toward settlement of the central question. This boils down to the degree of autonomy, of freedom from Greek administrative and police control, that the Turkish community would have under a new constitution. On the whole, the chances are fairly good that the combination of the talks themselves, some progress within them, and the generally benevolent attitude of Greece and Turkey will suffice to keep the situation from erupting into serious hostilities. Yet there remain within the Greek Cypriot community die-hard advocates of union with Greece. And there is a chance that an accident—and shooting incidents occur from time to time—could escalate into a major communal confrontation, despite the desires of many on both sides to avoid one and despite the presence of the UN force on Cyprus. If Ankara perceived a large-scale threat to Turkish Cypriot lives, it would feel under strong pressure to intervene. We do not think such a development is likely, but it cannot be ruled out.

36. If the Turks did come to feel a need to use force, their first choice would be selected application of it, e.g., through airstrikes, as a warning. If that tactic failed, it is at least possible that they would invade Cyprus. Since the Turks would undoubtedly have local air superiority, the Greeks would probably not seek to reinforce their compatriots on the island. But some form of hostilities between Greece and Turkey would be probable, and in any case there would be serious disruption of the eastern wing of NATO. To repeat, however, this is a contingency, not a likelihood.

429. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 1, 1970, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Opium

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador

S/NM—Mr. Harry Schwartz

NEA/TUR—Frank E. Cash, Jr.

The Secretary began by expressing his regrets about the earthquakes in Turkey.² Ambassador Esenbel said his Government was grateful for the assistance provided by Embassy Ankara. The Secretary said we would continue to do everything we could.

The Secretary then said that he, the President, and all Americans are seriously concerned about the narcotics problem in the United States. Its consequences are tragic. Any delay in control efforts is destructive. Ambassador Handley wishes to discuss the illicit opium arriving in this country from Turkey further with Prime Minister Demirel just as soon as possible. We would like to move very fast on this. Public and Congressional pressure is building up. This is really the only problem existing between our two Governments. Everything else is going smoothly. We don't think money is a problem. We're prepared to compensate Turkish farmers.

In response to the Secretary's question as to whether Mr. Schwartz had anything to add, the latter said what we fear is the loss of a generation.

Ambassador Esenbel said the GOT has taken some control measures at its borders. A new security force is being equipped to cope with the illicit traffic. Turkey has cooperated for many years with the U.S., France, and Germany in this field. Poppy cultivation in Turkey has been gradually reduced from an initial forty-two provinces down to nine at present and will shortly be restricted even further. The Foreign Minister has been dealing with this matter very confidentially, and the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS 17 US TUR. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on April 7. The meeting took place in Secretary Rogers's office.

² The earthquakes struck western Anatolia March 28-29 destroying and damaging a number of towns and leaving 1,200 killed and 90,000 homeless.

Ambassador did not have precise information on the program. He did know, however, that a high-level decision has been made to eradicate poppy cultivation completely, but he did not know how rapidly this could be done. Turkish farmers have grown poppies for cooking oil for 800 years. It is, therefore, not so easy to uproot such a tradition. It will take time. It is not really a question of money.

The Secretary said that inasmuch as 80% of the illicit heroin coming into the U.S. is believed to originate in Turkey, we would be willing to cooperate in any kind of control system.

In response to the Ambassador's question, Mr. Schwartz said the UN machinery is not effective in producing the results the U.S. must have.

The Secretary said the only real solution is the cessation of poppy cultivation. We could compensate—or more than compensate—any loss. There is bound to be more and more public discussion of this issue, and Turkey's reputation in this country will suffer. This we would regret. We know the Turkish Government is trying to be helpful, and we are not unappreciative. But speed is essential. And, once again, we are willing to help in any way we can. Ambassador Handley will be discussing this further with the Prime Minister.

Ambassador Esenbel said he would report the Secretary's remarks. He believes his Government is fully aware of this problem.

The Ambassador said that, at the request of the Robert College Board, he would like to mention the fact that the College needs about a million dollars more a year in AID funds in order not to be forced to cut back its operations, which would be a shame.

Mr. Cash explained that we and the College are caught between spiralling cost of education and limited amounts of AID funds.

The Secretary told the Ambassador we would see what we could do.

430. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

FY 1970 Economic Assistance Program for Turkey

Secretary Rogers (Tab A) requests your approval of a \$40 million AID program loan to Turkey. The funds will finance imports of capital goods, raw materials, and spare parts required by Turkey to expand its industrial and agricultural capabilities. All agencies, including Budget (Tab B), concur.²

U.S. development lending to Turkey is provided in the framework of a consortium of aid donors sponsored by the OECD. For 1970, as in the past two years, other bilateral donors will provide \$60 million in *new program loans*, and the U.S. is expected to again provide \$40 million.

More than two years ago, Turkey announced a plan to end reliance on concessional loans by 1972. The U.S. subsequently reduced its bilateral lending level (project *and* program loans) to Turkey from \$125 million in FY 1967 to \$68 million in FY 1968 to \$40 million in FY 1969. The current proposal does not further reduce the total largely because the Turks have not yet devalued the lira and made the economic adjustments required to become more self-reliant.

There is general agreement among consortium members that the most urgent development issue for Turkey is the need for a comprehensive reform of trade policies and a substantial devaluation of the lira. The Turkish Government is fully aware of the views of the consortium members, recognizes that this is a crucial development policy issue, and has recently begun serious negotiations with the IMF on these matters. The Secretary feels that, while supporting the IMF, the U.S. should avoid direct involvement in these politically sensitive negotiations and that we should not make the U.S. loan, or any part thereof, dependent upon Turkish devaluation or reform.

I fully agree, since any such pressure might cause political friction and jeopardize the negotiations. Prime Minister Demirel is having

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Confidential. Bergsten sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a June 1 covering memorandum recommending it be sent to the President.

² Tabs are attached, but not printed.

political difficulties and devaluation will be difficult enough without resentment of U.S. pressure. Besides, he understands the need; his problem lies mainly in finding a way to manage this step politically.

Should devaluation be effected, substantial supplemental financing would be needed to counter possible speculation and permit a measure of import liberalization. Secretary Rogers suggests that we stand ready to contribute up to \$25 million as our share of such assistance and AID is prepared to make such funds available if they are required.

Secretary Kennedy had originally raised an objection to providing this loan until Turkey had agreed to eliminate its opium production. Treasury subsequently withdrew its objection for this year and agreed with State that withholding our aid loan might aggravate political relations and restrict Demirel's ability to be helpful on the opium problem. This is being actively pursued with Demirel and Foreign Minister Caglayangil.

In addition to the requested \$40 million, the U.S. is providing Turkey \$45 million under PL 480 and \$4 million in technical assistance for a total FY 1970 economic aid program of \$89 million. We are also providing \$150 million in grants of military equipment and supplies, including excess stocks.

This continues to be one of our most important aid efforts. Turk performance remains spotty, but it is sound enough to justify the aid, and our joint objective of preparing Turkey for eventual full membership in the European Community continues to be of high strategic importance.

Recommendation

That you approve the proposal for a \$40 million AID loan to Turkey for an additional \$25 million as part of special consortium financing if necessary in the event of Turkish exchange reform.³

³ Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on June 8.

431. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Turkish Affairs (Cash) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, June 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Let's Not Throw the Turkish Baby Out With the Narcotics Bathwater

Last December Moynihan told Bill Handley and me that we should bomb the Blue Mosque in retaliation for the way the Turks are "aggressing" against us with opium.² (The same day, incidentally, the President told Bill in low key, "do your best.") We thought at the time Moynihan was joking. Now, I'm not so sure.

I am becoming increasingly concerned that various people in the Government (including Rossides,³ who has demonstrated his disregard for US-Turkish relations, and Kleindienst)⁴ without responsibility for US foreign relations, but understandably anxious and frustrated over our horrendous narcotics problem, may be fully prepared to see irreparable damage done to all our other interests in Turkey in the attempt to solve this problem. And—worst of all—without any real prospect that our narcotics problem will thus be solved.

At least with the "Johnson letter"⁵ there was a real chance that a Greek-Turkish war would be prevented. This was accomplished and, therefore, the risk—and the high price paid in damage to US-Turkish relations—was, in my view, justified.

But if Turkey produced not one more poppy, our problem would not be solved. Opium is produced in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, India, etc. etc. As long as there is a demand, there will be a supply. Furthermore, even if the USG can agree internally that opium should be eliminated worldwide, which is very doubtful, and could achieve this, which is even more doubtful, the experts say addicts would find a substitute—any substitute (LSD for example)—because their need is so compelling.

¹ Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 74 D 29, Soc 11-5. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and sent through Davies (NEA). A copy was sent to Saunders.

² No record of this conversation was found. Sisco drew an arrow from this line and annotated: "I agree. Pls be sure I'm on clearance for everything. Stay alert. I'm willing to confront Moynihan. JJS."

³ Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

⁴ Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.

⁵ Reference is to President Johnson's June 5, 1964, letter to Prime Minister Inonu warning against military intervention in Cyprus. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 54.

In other words, this is a problem that must be solved primarily at the heart, i.e. the user in this country, and secondarily by attempting to control what comes in over the borders of this country, not what goes out over the borders of any number of other countries throughout the world.

The argument is made that if an abrupt cessation of Turkish production could be obtained (which it can't), narcotics dealers would be flushed out in their attempts to rearrange their supply lines to other sources. It seems incredible that as adroit as these criminals are, and with all the publicity our efforts with Turkey have been given—over our and the Turks' objections—that other arrangements have not been made. Surely contingency planning is not a government monopoly.

All of this is not to say that we should not urge the Turks to do everything possible that will be of real assistance to us; we should and are. And we should be willing to pay the price the achievable results are worth.

The questions are: what will be of real assistance to us; what is achievable; and what should we pay?

Since 1966 we have been putting heavy pressure on Demirel (to the point of irritating him considerably), and he has: been progressively reducing the provinces in which poppies may be grown (with a resultant loss of votes); cooperating with us in improving control, including permitting US agents to roam Turkey (a considerable risk for both him and us); and promised to end production in '71. He, incidentally, is the *only* one who has been willing to commit himself to eradication. All other Turks have emphasized increased controls only. If we lose Demirel—a real possibility even if we don't add to his present serious difficulties—we lose the Turkish commitment to eradication.

Bill Handley says—and I think his telegrams show—that he has used every arrow in his quiver with the Turks on opium. Although they have been stupid in not sending someone from Ankara to the CCMS, we are convinced that they are doing as much as they can to help us.

I am certain from the various noises that have been made that we will quite soon be under very heavy pressure to use AID, PL 480, MAP, and anything else available as blunt instruments to bludgeon the Turks into doing our bidding. Anyone who knows the Turks knows this simply won't work. They are just not amenable to that kind of persuasion. Worse yet, if there are even indications of this kind of direct pressure, such as a holdup of the program loan or a delay in PL 480, this will get the Turks' backs up and may well cause a slackening in the cooperation we are presently getting on narcotics. If such pressure were to become public knowledge—as would almost certainly be the case—our other exceedingly important interests in Turkey would suffer.

Our relations with Turkey can't stand another "Johnson letter" with so little prospect of accomplishing what we wish.

432. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy¹

Washington, June 29, 1970.

Dear Dave:

I know that your Department is extremely concerned, as are we all, over the drug problem in this country. You of course have a most important role to play through the Bureau of Customs in combatting the movement of drugs into the United States.

The most damaging drug, it goes without saying, is heroin. Since the illicit, as well as the legal, supply of heroin comes from abroad, the foreign policy implications of our domestic problem are considerable. An estimated eighty percent of the illicit heroin originates in Turkey, and therefore we have been conducting intensive negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to controlling the legal crop or eliminating all production.

It is in our interest to induce the Turkish authorities to accelerate their steps to restrict or to eliminate all opium production and to improve their control over existing poppy crops, in order to stem the flow of illicit opium into France, where it is converted to heroin. Our negotiations and our three million dollar loan to provide equipment for enforcement and crop substitution are to this end.

However, I feel very strongly that any measures we take that are considered by Turkey to be punitive in nature would not advance our goal of stemming the illicit diversion of opium and would do extensive damage to other exceedingly important aspects of our relationship with Turkey. On October 20, 1969, Attorney General Mitchell and Elliot Richardson sent a memorandum to the President,² in response to his request for a report on the narcotics problem, which reviewed, among other subjects, the possibility of sanctions. In the case of Turkey, they pointed out the extensive foreign relations costs of withholding assistance to Turkey. In my opinion, the same situation exists today.

With this in mind, we have learned with some concern from members of your staff that, at the time Turkey's recent request for 850,000 tons of wheat under PL 480 wheat comes up for interagency consideration,

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 73 A 1975, 000.1-333 Turkey, 1970. Confidential. A copy of the letter was sent to Packard. In an attached July 21 letter to Johnson, Laird noted that "I fully share the views and concerns you expressed in your letter [to Kennedy]" and offered his support.

² A copy of the memorandum and accompanying report on the illegal international narcotics trade is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969.

Treasury is prepared to delay approval of the request. The reason, as we understand it, is that the United States should provide no further assistance to Turkey until the Turkish authorities are more forthcoming on restricting, or eliminating, opium production.

I strongly urge you not to tie approval of Turkey's request for PL 480 wheat to the steps the Turks are taking concerning their opium production. The following are my reasons for asking you to agree to this position.

1) Elliot Richardson has informed me that his recent conversations with Turkish officials³ have convinced him that we have already exerted about as much bilateral pressure as the traffic will bear. This is one of the reasons we have moved into a multilateral framework. Substantial further pressure will, in my opinion, get the Turks' backs up, not advance us any further down the road toward greater control or eradication, and do considerable damage to other aspects of our relationship.

2) Prime Minister Demirel has weathered an intra-party dispute in a weakened condition, following a very close vote of confidence in March. This makes it much more difficult for him to take dramatic steps in curtailing or eliminating opium production, since he faces a reaction from his rural constituency in the provinces concerned. It also makes him more vulnerable to criticism that he is bowing to foreign pressure. Our failure to ship wheat when the harvest has been unfavorable and the need becomes critical could affect the survival of his government, in the context of a domestic situation which shows considerable signs of instability. Any successor to Demirel would almost certainly be less cooperative on the opium question.

3) Taking into consideration the very high priority this Administration attaches to stemming the flow of illicit heroin into the U.S., there are still other vital aspects to the United States-Turkish relationship. Turkey is an essential element in NATO's southern flank. In a June 11 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee in Brussels, Defense Secretary Laird referred to the President's February 18 foreign policy message, "in which (the President) reiterated that the security of NATO remains the most important foreign policy interest of the United States."⁴ There are forces at work in Turkey seeking its withdrawal from NATO and from its western orientation, and a refusal of U.S. assistance considered to be critical would certainly accelerate this tendency. Furthermore, we wish not to affect adversely the continued existence of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] installations, our overflight arrangements

³ Richardson also described these conversations, April 22 and May 13, in a May 19 memorandum to Kissinger. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS TUR)

⁴ For the text of the President's message, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116-190.

(Turkish airspace is critical to our access to the Middle East), and Sixth Fleet access to Turkish ports. The continuation of a relatively stable and friendly Turkey in the volatile Middle East is certainly in our interest.

4) The Turks are cooperating with us in our mutual efforts to prevent the illicit diversion of their opium production. They are not progressing as rapidly as we would like, but they are progressing. Turkey is continuing to restrict the number of provinces where legal production is authorized. Efforts to tighten the collection of this year's crop reportedly have been good, and the Government has committed itself to purchasing as much of the crop as possible. At considerable risk of public disapproval, the Turkish authorities have agreed to an augmentation of the number of our narcotics officials in Turkey to help with their enforcement efforts.

In conclusion, I believe that we are proceeding in the right direction by pursuing the narcotics problem in an international framework. It is not necessary, and it would be highly counterproductive, to adopt such drastic steps as withholding assistance in order to press the Turks to be more forthcoming. I hope that you will agree, and that we can allow the current Turkish request for wheat under PL 480 to be considered under the usual criteria.

Sincerely,

Alex

433. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, July 18, 1970, 1110Z.

4533. Subject: Narcotics. Reference: Ankara 4427.²

1. Prior to his departure Friday, Ambassador had intensive discussions Thursday with principal Turkish officials concerned with present and future production of opium in Turkey. This included late evening session between Ambassador and Foreign Minister, with

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

² Dated July 15, it reported that the Ambassador and Caglayangil had agreed to meet to discuss the narcotics issue. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 TUR)

Eralp and Esenbel present on their side and DCM accompanying Ambassador. Discussions were detailed, very frank, and at times heated. Foreign Minister was well briefed on situation, including use of maps. Meeting, which lasted one and half hours was in private quarters of Foreign Minister's official residence. Earlier in day, Ambassador had two-hour session with Prime Minister's assistants Ozansoy and Fer on subject. All conversations were held against background of Ambassador's being recalled to Washington for consultation on subject,³ and preceded by Ambassador's exposition of problem as presented by Assistant Secretary Sisco to Esenbel (State 106419).⁴

2. Discussions indicated that Turks deeply aware of importance subject to US. Esenbel, who had lunch with Ambassador Thursday, told him that he had had long discussions with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Monday night on subject.

3. It clear that GOT feels that it is now running into heavy weather on subject, both with US and in terms domestic politics, and that, with full understanding of importance to US, it not in position to eliminate production opium in foreseeable future. GOT is, however, making major effort (a) to buy up this year's entire crop and (b) to enact legislation on licensing (copy of bill was given to Ambassador Thursday and now being translated). Major element that concerned them is that members their own party, as well as opposition, now seizing on issue of US interference in local and internal Turkish matter as reported septels.⁵

4. Conclusion we reached as result these discussions is that fine print in current existing legislation, which requires GOT to give one year's notice in advance to opium cultivators before restrictions on plantings can be made in their provinces, made it impossible for GOT to go beyond seven provinces this year, since last year's announcement stipulated that cultivation would continue in seven provinces for planting in fall of 1970.

5. Critical issue will be collection this year, enactment of legislation, and GOT decision as to what it will announce one year from now regarding future plantings. Yesterday's discussion gave us indication

³ In telegram 108983 to Ankara, July 9, the Department informed Handley: "The President has expressed his strong disappointment in progress made to suppress illicit drug traffic and has made clear that notwithstanding the defense and political components of the problem, he places the highest priority on this issue. Accordingly, you should inform the GOT that because of grave concern over problem you have been asked to return for consultation." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971.)

⁴ Dated July 3, it reported on Sisco's July 2 discussions with Esenbel regarding narcotics issues. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 TUR)

⁵ Not further identified.

that GOT believes it can comply with 1961 Single Convention, assuming present law on licensing passes Parliament this year, and that area which it might consider for opium cultivation to be announced before June 30, 1971 will be limited to Afyon and Isparta. Their view is that with licensing, with controls, and with good record of farmers in these areas selling their opium crops to government, and not to black marketeers, Turkey could be in position to restrict opium sales entirely to legal purchasers.

Cuthell

434. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance for Turkey

Issue

On Sunday,² Turkey is expected to devalue the lira. The IMF, with our strong support, has been urging this for years as the most critical step needed to bolster the Turkish economy. An IMF meeting on Sunday will ask a number of donors to make new aid contributions to support the devaluation; our share will probably be about \$25 million.

Devaluation

Devaluation will make the Turkish economic system much more competitive, enable her to liberalize her import controls, and promote an increase in exports. It is therefore of critical importance to her economic development. It has been urged on her for years by all outside observers, but has not happened before because of the extreme political sensitivity of the exchange rate in Turkey.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret. Sent for action. An attached August 7 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger recommended that if Kissinger wanted to raise the issue with the President, he send this memorandum. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten's memorandum: "File, don't forward. HAK."

² August 8.

However, substantial financial assistance will be required to counter the possibility of speculation against the lira *after* the devaluation, and permit a measure of import liberalization. As part of a special multilateral assistance package designed by the IMF, we would be asked to provide approximately \$25 million to the Turks.

In June I approved, on your behalf, Secretary Rogers' recommendation for an aid loan to Turkey of \$40 million with the understanding that an additional \$25 million would be provided if Turkey devalued.³ I continue to feel strongly that we should respond positively, on both economic and foreign policy grounds.

I raise the issue only because of our narcotics problem with the Turks. Secretary Kennedy had originally raised an objection to providing the loan until Turkey had agreed to eliminate its opium poppy production, although Treasury subsequently withdrew its objection and agreed with State that withholding it might aggravate political relations and *restrict* Demirel's ability to be helpful on the opium problem.

Demirel, in the subsequent months, has sharply reduced the number of provinces in which opium could legally be grown. He could ideally have done more. However, the opium producing provinces are important strongholds of his Justice party, which has only recently emerged from a divisive political crisis in which forty of its members voted with the opposition, defeated the budget, and forced resignation of the Government. Had Demirel banned opium production in all provinces, it is probable that he would have been unable to survive politically.

Despite the severity of the narcotics problem, I continue to believe that support for Demirel and his efforts to gradually end opium poppy production will serve both our foreign policy interests and our domestic interests better than utilizing aid as a leverage factor over the Turks. The Turks will require the \$25 million to support the devaluation which we have long encouraged, and which is crucial to our long-term interests in Turkey. Withholding these funds could severely damage the Turkish economy and our relationship with Turkey which, as a NATO ally, is important to us. A major aggravation of our relationship with the Turks would also make it more difficult for Demirel, or a successor, to cooperate with us on the opium problem.

Recommendation

That you approve the additional \$25 million in economic assistance to Turkey. John Ehrlichman, Pat Moynihan, State, and Treasury agree. (Pat suggested that, in doing so, we make clear to the Turks that

³ See Document 430.

this by no means indicates that we are not serious about the opium problem. I have instructed the agencies and our representative at the IMF to do so.)⁴

⁴ Kissinger initialed the approval line: for Nixon.

435. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 17, 1970, 1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
William Handley, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Emil Mosbacher, U.S. Chief of Protocol
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

After general conversation during a photo session, Ambassador Handley opened the substantive part of the meeting by explaining to the President the recent restrictions which the Government of Turkey has decreed to decrease the number of provinces in which the opium poppy is grown. He showed the President a page-size map indicating the provinces in which it is still legal to grow opium and those in which growing has recently been prohibited. He then explained that the next step is for the Turkish Government to pass a licensing bill which would provide stricter measures for enforcing the limitations on growing.

The President responded by saying that it is very important that we cut off as many sources of these drugs as we possibly can. The drug problem has become a serious one not only in our cities but in our suburbs.

The President then asked how our relations are generally with Turkey.

Ambassador Handley replied that they are fundamentally sound. The Turkish Government still bases its policy on the NATO alliance. It is devoting more of its GNP to NATO goals than any other of our NATO partners. When the U.S. was recently forced to withdraw from Wheelus

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

Base in Libya,² the Turks quietly permitted us to expand our range facilities at Incirlik Airbase. There has recently been a back lash against the Turkish left following its challenge to the army in recent public disorders. The President indicated his understanding that the army occupies a special place in recent Turkish history as a defender of the republic. Ambassador Handley said that anti-Americanism by itself is not a major problem but that the leftists use that issue for their own purposes in attacking the Turkish establishment.

The President asked who makes up the left in Turkey. Ambassador Handley replied that since there is no legal Communist party, the formal left is the Turkish Labor Party with a base among the young and among the Marxist element in the Turkish labor movement.

Ambassador Handley volunteered that we had recently “run into something of a buzz saw” in relation to the opium question and Turkish public opinion. A number of those who wish to attack the Turkish establishment have tried to capitalize on the charge that the Demirel Government is bowing to American pressure in reducing opium growing.

The President reiterated that it is very important for us to close off as many sources of narcotics as possible but said that we do not want to embarrass the Demirel Government. He repeated: “You tell them that we won’t embarrass them publicly. But privately you should say that this issue is terribly important to us.” The President concluded by saying, “That is the line.”

Ambassador Handley noted that he had briefed several Congressional groups during his present consultation. He explained the pressures that are building up in the form of amendments to trade and aid legislation which would throw the whole issue back into the President’s lap to decide whether Turkey, for instance, is taking adequate measures to control opium growing. The Ambassador said he felt that, at this point, Turkey could be judged to be taking serious steps. He explained some of the details of the licensing bill that the Government will attempt to have passed at the next parliamentary session—how it provides for Government collectors of the crop to pay cash, provides per diem for them, and so on.

The President indicated his understanding of this improved collection effort, noting the importance of quiet cooperation. He likened the Congressional pressures to those against military assistance to Greece. There were those here—as well as the Danes and others—who felt we should not aid Greece. But with the situation what it is in the

² Reference is to the demand for U.S. withdrawal from Libya made following the 1969 overthrow of the government of King Idris by officers of the Libyan army.

eastern Mediterranean, one looks at the Danish forces and at Greece's 10 divisions and the choice is pretty clear. One looks at the Turkish forces and dedication to NATO and it is plain that we cannot jeopardize our fundamental relationship.

H.S.

436. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, October 5, 1970, 1200Z.

6301. Subject: Ingersoll Visit to Turkey—Presidential Letter. Ref: State 159705 and 163371.²

1. I have serious doubts about having the President write a "secret letter" to the Prime Minister of Turkey on the opium question. Letters of this kind do not stay secret very long, and it will be recalled that my own instructions were to discuss the matter personally with the Prime Minister and deliver only an oral message from the President to him.

2. In the present atmosphere surrounding opium, it is absolutely essential that there be no indication of heavy unilateral US pressure on the Prime Minister at a moment when he is girding himself for a major political fight at his convention this month and facing the opening of Parliament the first week of November. Moreover, a letter from a former President of the United States (i.e., the Johnson letter on Cyprus) still remains the single most painful event (as far as the Turks are concerned) in our history since World War II.

3. There is no doubt in the Prime Minister's mind of the President's personal interest in this matter. I have communicated that a number of times, and against the risks I do not see anything to be gained at this time by having a personal written letter from the President to Prime Minister Demirel delivered by Mr. Ingersoll.

4. With regard to the suggestion in para 5 (State 159705) that Mr. Ingersoll be given a Presidential letter to be shown here and elsewhere,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² Telegram 159705, September 9, 1970, to Ankara outlined plans for Ingersoll's visit to Turkey. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/INGERSOLL) Telegram 163371 to Ankara, October 3, reported that Ingersoll had told Turkish representatives that he would carry a letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Demirel on the issue of narcotics. (Ibid.)

I do not have strong feelings one way or the other. I do think, however, that its use might be awkward here since I do not know how it would be used in practice. Simply to show it to the Prime Minister and retain it for use elsewhere makes it look like a passport. However, I do not feel strongly about this, and it may be of use in opening doors elsewhere. Frankly, I believe that it would be more tasteful and less awkward if Mr. Ingersoll, when he sees the Prime Minister, were to say something like this: "As you know, Ambassador Handley has told you of the deep interest that the President has in this matter. The President has asked me, following the recent meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to make a trip through various capitals in Europe, and it is for that reason that I am here." Certainly he will not have to show credentials. They will be assumed.³

Handley

³ In telegram 167166 to Ankara, October 9, the Department forwarded the text of a Presidential letter that conformed to Handley's suggestions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971) A copy of the letter is *ibid.*

437. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1970, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel postponed his visit to the United States, citing among other reasons his desire to be in Ankara when the Turkish Parliament voted on an opium licensing bill.

438. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Turkey

¹ Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 65, DEF 19 MAP. Confidential. Drafted by Pugh on January 4, 1971. Esenbel read his comments from a prepared aide-mémoire. A copy is attached but not printed.

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Ambassador of Turkey
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director, Turkish Affairs
Robert L. Pugh, Desk Officer, Turkish Affairs

Ambassador Esenbel drew on a telegram which he said had been sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish General Staff, and the Office of the Prime Minister. He indicated that the Government of Turkey noted with satisfaction that the message President Nixon sent to the Congress transmitting the request for a supplemental appropriation to the 1971 Foreign Assistance bill² made specific reference to the defense posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in particular to Turkey, in its indication that part of the funds requested were to restore the Turkish MAP program to the level projected before the emergency situation in Cambodia caused the diversion of \$25.5 million.

The Ambassador then referred to the NATO Defense Ministers' call for increased effort to assist the defense of the southeastern flank.³ He pointed out that the Turkish armed forces in order to maintain an agreed standard within NATO, and thus insure a creditable deterrent, required a programmed level of continuing assistance. He noted that this level had been mutually calculated to be \$670 million worth of equipment and other forms of assistance for a period of five years beginning in 1966. This was according to the McNaughton Plan, which foresaw a yearly allocation of \$135 million worth of such military assistance. He stated that during the last four years the level of assistance had fallen short of that figure and amounted to only \$427 million of military assistance in total. Ambassador Esenbel recalled that during the visits to Ankara of Secretary of Defense Laird and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter⁴ this problem had been reviewed and the possibility of surplus military assistance had been considered. Ambassador Esenbel characterized the long supply and excess (LS&E), or surplus material, program as an additional point but noted that this could not be planned ahead and could never replace programmed military assistance. He stated that when one dealt in surplus assistance, it was in emergency circumstances—in that it was necessary to take whatever was offered when it was available—and that there was no comparison with programmed aid.

With the preceding as background, Esenbel said that the Turkish Government deemed it appropriate at the moment to bring to the

² On November 18; for text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 1074–1079.

³ At the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels December 3–4; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1971, pp. 2–6.

⁴ December 1–2.

attention of the United States Government that while the reinstatement of funds to bring the FY 1971 MAP level to \$100 million would improve the existing situation, the urgent needs of modernization of the Turkish armed forces would still remain an acute problem. He felt these needs were well known to the USG through continuing discussions between the US Military Mission in Turkey and the Turkish General Staff. He stated the wish of the GOT that the USG again make an effort to reach the McNaughton level of military assistance.

Mr. Sisco observed that: (1) the final disposition of the MAP supplemental was not yet clear, as there were differences to be sorted out, and he felt that it would be clear that day whether action would be taken immediately or deferred until the week of December 28; (2) the USG would continue to do the best it could; (3) the LS&E program was never conceived as a full substitute for MAP, but was suggested because the USG was concerned about the temporary cut from \$100 million to \$74.5 million; and (4) while it was not conceived as a permanent substitute for MAP, it did fit in to Turkish force goal needs. He counseled Esenbel to await Congressional action, following which the situation would be examined once more.

Ambassador Esenbel said that the point he was trying to make was that when Ambassador Handley went to the Foreign Minister during the past summer with word of the cut to \$74.5 million, it caused a shock within the Turkish Government. Esenbel (who was in Turkey for the summer) reported that he had talked on this topic with the Prime Minister who, he said, had felt that the US could have obtained the needed funds elsewhere. Ambassador Esenbel noted that he had told the Prime Minister that the time (July 1970) was not ripe for the US Government to ask for legislation to provide the additional military assistance funds needed for Cambodia, but that he anticipated it would be done later. Ambassador Esenbel stated that when the interested officials of the GOT saw that the request when finally submitted was for one billion dollars, a problem was created. They could not understand why if one billion dollars was attainable, the Turkish MAP level could not be restored to the McNaughton level of \$135 million. In response to Ambassador Esenbel's question about the adjournment of Congress, Mr. Sisco noted that it was making a major effort to get critical items through before Christmas, but that it would return to work December 28, if necessary.

439. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY*Background*

There is a fundamental dichotomy in Turkey's political life between the elitists of the urban, educated minority and the mass-based politicians. The elitists feel that only they are capable of giving Turkey the enlightened, progressive leadership it needs, while their political opponents are better characterized as populists. Among the elitists are the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the principal opposition party. It is flanked on its left in the political spectrum by the small, Marxist, Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and by a congeries of splintered, radical-left student groups.

The 1965 election victory of the Justice Party (JP) marked the return to power, after a five-year lapse, of representatives of the same segments of Turkish society which had been removed from power in the 1960 military revolution. This military intervention was largely supported by the elitists and was brought about by economic mismanagement and political repression.

The Democrat Party (DP), which was deposed by the 1960 military revolution, and the JP, its successor, were brought to power with the support of the conservative peasantry and of the commercial class. The JP has been led throughout its five years in office by Suleyman Demirel, who has exhibited during his tenure unusual skill in economic policy and an unanticipated ability to maintain an effective working relationship with Turkey's military leaders.

Current Situation

In the past year, charges of corruption on the part of Demirel's brothers gave a convenient issue to some within his party and to the opposition to use in trying to remove him. However, Prime Minister Demirel, himself, precipitated the latent intra-Justice Party (JP) crisis by excluding from his post-1969 election cabinet representatives of his party's more conservative right wing. This faction, in turn, deprived the JP Government of its large majority in the National Assembly by making an open break with Demirel. They did this by voting against

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret. The paper was sent to Kissinger on December 23 by Eliot who indicated it was "prompted by recent developments."

the budget in February 1970, and then adding their weight to the intractability of the opposition. Turkey's National Assembly has managed to accomplish little since this event.

The November 1 reconvening of the Grand National Assembly produced an immediate crisis when agreement could not be reached on presiding officers for either house. Party discipline failed because of the secret balloting, allowing JP dissidents still within the Party to frustrate with impunity the election of the legislature's leaders. The first month of the new session was thus wasted, as no other matters could be taken up until the leadership issue was finally resolved. This was succeeded as a pre-empting issue by various attacks on, or charges against, Demirel, including the corruption issue. He overcame the corruption charge, perhaps temporarily, in a Grand National Assembly vote supporting a committee report that the corruption issue was not valid.

The violence perpetrated in recent years by radical-left students stimulated the growth of countervailing violence by radical-right elements, and Turkey's universities have suffered greatly in the attendant atmosphere of coercion and chaos. A number of deaths, many injuries, and considerable property damage have been the physical result of this chain of circumstances. Turkey's urban populace, at first benevolently neutral in the main toward the radical-left actions—including a number of anti-American incidents in which the United States was basically a surrogate target for the JP Government—seems to have had enough of student violence. In addition, there apparently is widespread dismay at the irresponsibility and ineffectuality of the Grand National Assembly in the face of Turkey's many problems, not the least of which is continued student violence.

Demirel's compatibility with the Turkish military establishment was never universal, and over the years since 1965 there have been intermittent CAS reports of coup-plotting. This usually has been at the colonel level and sometimes associated with members of the coup group of 1960, who appointed themselves life Senators before returning government control to civilian hands in 1961. Widespread frustration with the unhappy state of Turkish politics and the JP Government's inability to tackle many of Turkey's problems, especially student violence, has recently given rise to widespread rumors and further CAS reports of an increasing willingness of the Turkish military to intercede in the political process. These reports have begun to involve many of the top leadership, suggesting that Demirel's *modus vivendi* with them has been attenuated by the scale and intractability of the problems he has been unable to solve. Most recently, there have been reports of specific suggestions to President Sunay by the Air Force Commander, General Batur. In his capacity as a member of Turkey's NSC, he advocated changes in Turkey's governing institutions to permit more effective leadership of the nation.

Prognosis

The attempt to unseat Demirel doubtless will continue and is likely to be more vigorously pursued by the elitists and by the JP right-wing spin-off group, which formed the Democratic Party on December 19. The majority of the JP will be extremely reluctant to withdraw support from Demirel, since they realize that—as Foreign Minister Caglayangil has analyzed the situation—the withdrawal of Demirel as Prime Minister will only encourage redoubled attacks on any JP successor, and the JP would have sacrificed Demirel in vain. If the JP Government is unable to reassert its control, perhaps because of further defections from the party's right flank, the calling of new elections is a probability. These could be held as early as May 1971.

The military remains a somewhat unpredictable factor. Intervention of some kind is a distinct possibility if the JP Government fails to come to grips with the critical issues, such as student violence, and if the Grand National Assembly continues to act irresponsibly. A limited intrusion by senior officers to bring about changes designed to induce greater stability and responsibility in government, such as an altered elections law, seems most likely. This might well be through the assumption by President Sunay, with the National Security Council, of much of the executive function. However, the field grade ranks were the locus of plotting for the 1960 military revolution, and the emergence of another such group cannot be excluded.

440. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Kidnappings in Turkey—As of 5:00 p.m. Saturday²

The search in Turkey is still on. After the campus disturbances and deaths yesterday, our embassy reports Ankara as “remarkably” calm today. Local press accounts have been condemning the kidnappers but have taken the opportunity for a few punches at the U.S. presence in Turkey. Your position on not pressing Turkey to negotiate has been given coverage.

There has been no further word from the terrorists since a message Friday addressed to the U.S. embassy which reiterated conditions for release and enclosed four—believed authentic—messages from the kidnapped airmen. This message did not explicitly threaten execution and now that the deadline has passed, it is generally felt in Turk circles that it will be extended *de facto*. The danger, of course, will continue until they are released.

Prime Minister Demirel has conveyed to Ambassador Handley that Turk efforts were being broadened today. The men are believed to be somewhere in the greater Ankara area and Turk police have raided local homes on the basis of “tip-offs.” There are no government plans to negotiate with the kidnappers. The Turks have also ruled out plans to impose martial law for the time being.

Ambassador Handley, in line with our policy, has told the Turkish government that we do not intend to pay ransom. This policy has come under attack here by families of the airmen speaking to the U.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. The memorandum was not initialed by Kissinger, but Haig initialed the first page.

² At 1:30 a.m. on March 4, four USAF airmen were abducted with their vehicle by “radical leftists” armed with automatic weapons. On the morning of March 4 messages were sent to Turkish news agencies and the Turkish radio organization demanding \$400,000 ransom by 6 p.m. on Friday and that a revolutionary manifesto the group provided be read over Turkish radio. The Department of State instructed the Embassy in Ankara to inform the Government that the United States would not pay the ransom, a decision that coincided with the Turkish Government’s unwillingness to pay ransom. (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, March 4; *ibid.*)

press. The Air Force prepositioned an aircraft in Athens containing the ransom sum on an extremis contingency basis pending any change in our policy, but it would not move without such a change.³

³ On March 8 Kissinger sent the President a memorandum, which Nixon saw, informing him that the kidnapped airmen had been freed unharmed. (Ibid.)

441. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS 314/02595-71

Washington, March 10, 1971.

COUNTRY

Turkey

DOI

10 March 1971

SUBJECT

Meeting of Command Council of the Armed Forces

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[7 lines not declassified]

1. An unprecedented meeting of the Command Council of the Armed Forces, chaired by Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief General Memduh Tagmac, took place at TGS headquarters in Ankara on 10 March from approximately 1000 to 1800 hours. The meeting was attended by the Commanders of the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy, by the Commanders of the First, Second and Third Armies, all Corps Commanders, all Air Force Area Commanders and a number of other general officers.

2. This meeting was convened at the insistence of a large number of senior officers to discuss and reach a firm decision on measures to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970-31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

be taken by the armed forces in the face of continuing deterioration of the political situation following the kidnapping of four American airmen on 4 March² and subsequent student-police clashes at Middle East Technical University and elsewhere.

3. Lieutenant General Hayati Savasci, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces [*1 line not declassified*] stated that the meeting would reach one of two decisions. Either the proposal by a number of younger generals for a military takeover of the government apparatus would be approved, or the solution favored by General Tagmac and others for dictation by the army to President Cevdet Sunay and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel of specific and immediate control measures to be implemented with a facade of civilian rule would have to be adopted. Savasci added that there were no other remaining alternatives.

4. Savasci further said that there no longer was any question of whether the army would intervene in the political situation. The army was intervening and it was merely the form that remained to be decided. He said it was important that a clear consensus be reached during the 10 March meeting. He explained that if divisions remained, a dangerous situation could result in which the disappointed parties might decide to try to force their own decisions on the others. Which-ever result is reached, Savasci said, it will be rapidly communicated down the line to all commands.

5. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]* *Comment: Air Force commanders, in particular, are quite heated up in favor of immediate military intervention and are expected to oppose strongly the Tagmac solution.*)

6. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]* *Comment: See [less than 1 line not declassified] (TDCS DB–315/01243–71) for another account of this meeting.*³ As of 2400 hours 10 March, Ankara was quiet and there were no visible signs of a military alert.)⁴

7. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

² See Document 440.

³ Not found.

⁴ After receiving the military ultimatum, Prime Minister Demirel and his Cabinet resigned on March 12.

442. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Krogh)¹

Washington, March 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Turkey's New Government and the Opium Problem

In response to your memos,² I asked CIA to give us its reading on the new Turkish government's³ possible attitudes and capabilities in relation to the problem of further reducing the flow of illegal opium from Turkey. The *main conclusions of the CIA analysts* are:

—The new Prime Minister's immediate preoccupation will be to regain control of public order by suppressing political radicals. The opium licensing bill now awaiting parliamentary consideration and the organizational changes in the collection and enforcement agencies will necessarily have lower priorities for the moment.

—Nevertheless, these programs have already achieved a momentum of their own. If the more violent dissidents can be brought under control and calm restored to college campuses, there is nothing to prevent the opium control program from moving forward or even accelerating during the next few months.

—Conscious of being under the watchful eye of the military, Parliament may now move ahead on the opium bill with far less debate in the pre-voting phase than was usually the case while Demirel was in office and each move became hostage to opposition efforts to make life uncomfortable for him.

—The military will set priorities in Turkey for the foreseeable future and are the final arbiters, even if they choose to go on as they are now working through a parliamentary government. They are essentially uninformed on the international opium problem as it affects Turkey. They have taken no stand. As you know, President Sunay has been initiated into the problem and his influence with the present top military leaders remains strong.

—Thus, the way is now open to convincing the military decision-makers of the urgency of the opium problem. We should encounter no

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Noforn. Sent for information. Concurred in by Downey and sent through Haig.

² Additional documentation relating to narcotics policy for Turkey is *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Members Office Files, Egil Krogh, Subject Files, Heroin/Turkey. Also see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 143–227.

³ Following Demirel's March 12 resignation under military pressure, President Sunay designated Nihat Erim to form a new government. Erim resigned from the Republican Peoples Party and formed a coalition government with representatives from both the RPP and Justice Party, which won a vote of confidence on April 7.

particular pre-conceptions or resistance, although the generals will probably be more receptive if they expect some tangible return to Turkey for their cooperation.

—Little is known of Prime Minister Erim's personal attitude toward this problem. He is, however, an expert on international law, and his recognition of Turkey's need to live up to its commitments under the 1961 UN convention can be used to encourage his support. He is genuinely well disposed toward the U.S. His political base is secure, and he would probably be far less deterred from acting than was Demirel by charges of subservience to U.S. interests.

Our program thus falls now under three objectives, and I have noted below each what I have asked State to do in respect to it:

1. The most urgent aspect of the program is to improve the enforcement and control measures in order to achieve the complete collection of this year's crop. This is critical because an effective program for buying up production would provide "insurance" against failure of the government to make other desired moves toward licensing and eradication. It would also have more immediate impact. As you know, a program for doing this came out of Jim Parker's⁴ December visit to Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish Soil Products Office (TMO), which is responsible for buying up the crop, has developed a program for enlarging its organization and increasing the collection force in each of the seven provinces where poppies are now grown legally. All of this can be done in the absence of a licensing law under the previous law that sets up the system for declaring opium to be grown. This law contains enough teeth to permit the government of Turkey to be sure the farmer fills out an honest declaration and then to collect everything declared.

Action being taken: Ambassador Handley has been authorized to say that the U.S. would meet the costs of this program. So far the Turks have acted as if they are prepared to handle these themselves. Unless BNDD sees technical deficiencies we can correct or further encouragement we can provide, this seems on the tracks.

2. The objective of second and almost parallel immediacy is the passage by parliament of the *licensing and control law*. Ambassador Handley has already made some approaches to the military and key members of parliament, stressing the importance which we attach to the passage of this legislation. If it does not seem to be moving as we would like, Secretary Rogers will put it on the top of his agenda when he goes to Ankara on April 30 for the CENTO ministerial meeting.

Action being taken: In addition to the above, I have asked that Ambassador Handley submit a plan for impressing on the military, as well

⁴ An officer of the BNDD.

as on members of the new government, the international significance of this legislation and the importance to U.S.-Turkish relations. This plan is due early next week.

3. The last action—chronologically—will be the approach we take to the Prime Minister's *proclamation, legally required by June 30, on the number of provinces where planting will be permitted* for the following year. You will recall that Demirel last June stated his intention in his announcement this June to reduce to four the number of provinces where poppy could be planted in the fall of 1971.

The main issue will be whether, as soon as the new government gets its feet on the ground in a couple of weeks, to make a major approach to the Prime Minister urging him to declare total eradication in his proclamation this June 30. The State Department informally feels that the best we could persuade him to do is to confirm planting in four provinces in this coming year, as Demirel had intended, and then announce reduction to one or two in the following year. If this were done, and if he followed up in his announcement in June 1972 of intent to reduce to zero the following June that would still permit the President to say before the 1972 conventions that Turkey had agreed to complete eradication, although there would still at that time be some production. Undoubtedly, however, there will be pressure here for a reduction to planting in no provinces in the announcement of this June.

Action being taken: I have asked State to begin drafting the instructions to Ambassador Handley on this approach.⁵ Unless there is unexpected agreement within our own ranks, I think this may well be the occasion for the next meeting of the Heroin Task Force, but let's see how the instructions develop.

This leaves one question untouched: How to counter some of the more adverse publicity now developing on this problem. State is conducting a series of press and Hill briefings now. However, it seems to me that we really ought to gear ourselves to capitalize on some concrete move such as passage of the licensing bill. If that happens, then there should be a major effort to focus attention on that achievement.

If you have further thoughts on the above, please let me know.⁶

⁵ The instructions were sent in telegram 62159 to Ankara, April 13. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971)

⁶ No response was found.

443. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, April 13, 1971, 1945Z.

62159. For Ambassador Handley from the Secretary. Subj: Opium. Ref: Ankara 2208.²

1. Greatly appreciate helpful and comprehensive message on steps we should take in initial contacts with new government. We endorse your view that opium is number one question, particularly in light estimate that strong likelihood of little if any change toward our other interests.

2. We agree with your basic analysis and strategy contained para 3 reftel. Given the lengths taken to maintain thread of constitutionality during recent crisis, we see no possibility that new government will contravene the decree which designates reduction from seven to four provinces for planting in 1971.

3. Concur that it wise and useful to summarize our discussions with GOT since 1966. You should indicate that GOT had informed us in 1967 that its goal was eradication to be accomplished over three to four year period to minimize adverse impact on Turkish farmer. Since new leadership has told us that it envisions continuity in foreign policy we hope that it will endorse goal of eradication. We believe that both on tactical grounds and as follow-on of our conversations with Demirel government you should inform Erim government we continue to feel eradication is best ultimate solution. Therefore you should ask Erim's plans in this regard, and in ensuing discussion propose no further planting beginning in 1972. If the GOT indicates that this timetable for eradication is not feasible, you should urge the reduction to one, or at the maximum two provinces in 1972 with corresponding decrease in acreage, coupled with assurances of an effective licensing, control and collection system.

4. It would be obviously unfair to make Turkish farmer suffer from economic dislocation that will result from eradication. We would prefer assistance to Turkey, if desired, move through the UN or other international institutions. The new UN fund for drug abuse control envisages assistance in law enforcement as well as pilot projects in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ogden; cleared by Sisco, Cash, H.R. Wellman (S/NM), Davies, Johnson, and Eliot; cleared for information by Ingersoll, Eugene Rossides (Treasury), MacDonald, F.A. Bartimo (OSD/COUNS), and CIA; approved by Rogers.

² Not found.

development of economic alternatives to opium production. USG will, if other sources cannot provide, stand ready consider assistance to ameliorate impact of eradication.

5. We agree that it would be most useful to continue broaden base of contacts within Turkey, building on your representations to major political parties, leaders of Grand National Assembly and discreet contacts with senior military leaders. We, too, see no advantage in actively involving military leaders and agree that any effort on our part to get them to take more active role will be resisted. However, we should definitely make sure they are kept will informed of our concerns. We will also attempt to stimulate greater activism on part of Germans, French and others to broaden third country contacts along lines you suggest.

6. We have already involved Turkish Ambassador more deeply and more frequently. Problem of opium raised with Esenbel by Under Secretary Johnson on March 22 and at greater length by Asst Sec Sisco April 1. Sisco pointed out public sentiment reflected in Congress were about forty measures pending aimed at stemming narcotics flow into US. Noted it important that pending licensing and control bill be enacted promptly, and equally important that a comprehensive plan be developed and adequate resources made available to collect the entire crop this year. Also urged that further reductions (number unspecified) be made in number of poppy provinces for 1972 planting.

7. Please advise soonest results your initial conversations with Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.³

Irwin

³ On April 22 the Embassy reported on a long conversation with Foreign Minister Olcay on that date in which Handley made the points mentioned in this telegram. (Telegram 2796 from Ankara, April 22; *ibid.*)

444. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Turkey Aid Loan for FY 71

Secretary Rogers (Tab A)² requests your approval of a \$40 million development loan for Turkey to include a program loan of \$25 million for commodity imports and a project loan of \$15 million to expand the Eregli steel mill.

At the Turkish Aid Consortium's April 27 pledging session, the US will be called upon to announce its pledged amount of aid for Turkey in FY 71. Failure to do so at that time would be interpreted by Turkey's new government as an indication of our lack of confidence in it. We have no reason to show any such lack of confidence and want to get off to a good start with Prime Minister Erim, who has reaffirmed Turkey's strong ties to NATO.

There is, however, a persuasive economic case for the loan. Last August Turkey, after considerable urging by the IMF, World Bank and ourselves, undertook a major economic reform program including a 40 percent exchange devaluation, institution of an incentive system for encouraging exports, removal of some restrictions on imports, and measures to hold down inflation. At this point it is too early to tell whether the reform will yield the significant results Turkish planners hope for, but preliminary indications point to some important successes. The proposed \$25 million AID program loan, coupled with similar loans from other donors and the multilateral institutions, should provide Turkey with adequate foreign exchange to continue its liberalization of imports, and increase the stability of the Turkish lira.

The Eregli steel mill, a private sector company with substantial Turkish government participation, was begun in 1962 and subsequently expanded with the participation of AID, the World Bank, and US private industry. Further expansion, designed to double its capacity, will be financed in part (roughly \$120 million) by Ex-Im and the World Bank; AID under the proposed project loan, would pick up \$15 million of the cost.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it.

² Attached but not printed.

The only issue that has arisen in connection with this loan was the question of whether the US pledge should be conditioned on a Turkish promise to announce this June an end to the planting of opium poppies in 1972. Secretaries Connally and Rogers have agreed that we should go ahead and make our pledge at the aid consortium meeting Tuesday—that it would not be wise to raise this issue in this international forum. They further agreed that Secretary Rogers would raise the question with the Turks when he is in Ankara at the end of the week. Although we have no commitments, the initial attitude of the new Turkish government on the opium question has been encouraging.

Recommendation: That you approve pledging \$40 million in aid for Turkey at the consortium meeting April 27 as recommended by Secretary Rogers. [The concurrence of the Office of Management and Budget is at Tab B.]³

³ Brackets in the original. The President initialed the approval option on April 26. Tab B is attached but not printed.

445. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 27, 1971.

Moynihan's idea of buying the entire Turkish opium crowd is one that seems intriguing. I realize there are problems here, but would you have a check made to see what, if anything, could be done. Connally seems to like the idea, provided it does not have other foreign policy implications which would militate against it.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/President Memos 1971-. No classification marking.

² The idea was endorsed by Secretary of the Treasury Connally during an April 27 meeting with the President. (Memorandum from Haig to Sonnenfeldt and Saunders, April 28; *ibid.*)

446. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 18, 1971, 1145Z.

3498. Subj: Opium Eradication Proposals, Meeting With Prime Minister Erim. Ref: A) State 84563; B) Ankara 3357.²

1. *Summary:* Prime Minister Erim recd me May 17 at 1630 in response my request for meeting which I had indicated would be on subject opium. Throughout our conversation he was entirely cordial, forthcoming and positive. Our proposals he said provided “answer” to question he had raised in our last meeting on substitute for opium if cultivation to be banned. Subsidy scheme especially interesting, he said, “could gain us a year.” At conclusion our talk he referred to paper I left with him (based on paras 3 through 8 reftel B) and instructed his aides (Asim Akyamac and Resat Arim, Director and Deputy Director General, IO Affairs, Foreign Ministry) to study it with interested ministries and put it “in proper form” soonest, in any event “before end of June.” *End summary.*

2. In 40 minute meeting with Prime Minister Erim late afternoon May 17 I presented our proposal for eradication opium production as outlined paras 3 through 8 reftel. Recalling our last meeting, when he had asked for our ideas on what might be offered peasant producers as substitute if poppy banned, I said we wished propose a program which seemed to us to be feasible way for banning further planting altogether this year. Control is difficult, demanding and expensive, I said, and as long as any production permitted some illicit traffic virtually inevitable. Even with tight controls some would get out and Turkey would be held accountable in world opinion. Total eradication best. I also recalled that since 1967 Ambassador Hart and later I had discussed this subject with Demirel. He had told us he hoped eliminate all planting within 3–5 years, i.e. by about 1972. Subject had also been discussed both here and in Washington with Foreign Minister Caglayangil, who had agreed eradication best solution. Prime Minister nodded acknowledgment these points but made no comment.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Adana, Izmir, and Istanbul.

² Telegram 84563 to Ankara, May 14, reads: “We agree with you that discussions need to be initiated soonest. Your proposals are an excellent beginning and suggest you present them GOT ASAP.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS–TUR) Telegram 3357 from Ankara, May 12, outlined the statement on opium eradication that Handley intended to make to Erim at their meeting. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971)

3. I then proceeded review fully our proposal for decree banning further production, subsidy payment scheme, announcement development plan for region centered on Afyon, and financing possibilities, including all elements paras 3 through 8 refetel B and concluded with expression willingness discuss details at any time with Turkish officials. During my discussion financing I took occasion, at mention of possible recourse to UN CND fund, to give him full page ad from *New York Times*, "The Poppy is also a Flower," showing serious effort in US to increase UN funds for opium control. I did not attempt go into details on financing beyond those included paras cited refetel. I concluded with assurance that "If you, sir, are interested, we think it can be done."

4. Prime Minister listened attentively to my presentation, without interruption, nodding occasionally his appreciation particular points. He appeared understand fully. Only when I had concluded did he speak up, saying it was true his idea was to "to prohibit all further cultivation" poppy plant but, as he had said in our first meeting, problem was what substitute could be offered producers. Now, he said, "your proposal provides answer." It must be carefully studied.

5. During ensuing discussion Prime Minister said draft control bill "going well," will provide that Turkish poppy production from seed to harvest will be controlled by single agency, TMO, in manner similar current sugar beet controls. But, he said, our proposed program has "most impressive element" in its proposal pay subsidy adding "this could gain us a year."

6. Reminded by his aide (Akyamac) that GOT Ministry Public Health has mentioned internal need for medicinal opium products Prime Minister said this could be taken from current stock or "it can be bought from another country." Control measures he said are not enough. Turkey has just raised price it will pay this year for current crop but traffickers will only raise their price to TL 500 or more; on Iranian border price already TL 2,000, he said. As he had noted in GOT program, Prime Minister continued, this humanitarian question and humanitarian considerations must always come before economic.

7. Prime Minister said twice during conversation he was troubled by question does GOT have legal authority ban planting altogether? Is such authority in new control bill? Akyamac said requirement was for one year advance notice before ban effective but then noted that subsidy scheme would seem eliminate need for such notice. I suggested new control bill (which Prime Minister said is planned become effective July 1 this year) could be used assure full collection this year, then ban production next year. As for application subsidy scheme, I said, four provinces listed for next year, and especially two of them (Afyon, Isparta) are principal growers, hence most desirable make ban effective there soonest.

8. In discussion what provinces would be affected Akyamac mentioned that while he was working on substitution plans with Ministry Agriculture, Ministry officials had said provinces recently taken out of production, not merely seven current or four authorized for next year, would want share in any substitution program. He also mentioned opium growing interest in Malatya was especially “persistent” and Prime Minister interjected that people from Konya had also pressed him for renewal authorization grow poppy at least in northern part. He then added, however, they must be made to “forget” poppy growing. In his own province 40 years ago people grew opium, now it is “forgotten.” This has been done in other provinces where growing progressively banned; it can be done with remainder.

9. At conclusion my initial presentation our proposals I had handed him copy of paper quoting almost verbatim from paras 3 through 8 reftel B which he accepted with expression appreciation. As our meeting drew to close he pointed to this paper and instructed his aides to take it up with Ministers Agriculture and Commerce, work it over with them to “put it in proper form” and do this “as soon as possible, before end of June.” Turning to me he said these are “good proposals” and he hoped they could be made to work.

10. *Comment:* I am greatly encouraged by positive attitude shown by Prime Minister Erim. Although we had some earlier indications he was being influenced to accept continued production with controls he seemed in our talk convinced that total eradication provides only answer to opium problem. Moreover, he seemed more than willing to accept our idea for immediate ban, if it could be done legally.

11. We must realize however that our proposals will now go to technicians for “study” and that what may finally emerge is unknown. We know some these technicians still believe strict controls should at least be given a chance. They may well try to delay implementation any eradication scheme on legal or technical grounds. There are also political pressures which will be brought to bear.

12. We should also be prepared for possibility Turkish version eradication plan will be costly, calling for additional aid input. I think it unlikely technicians will merely accept use of accumulated PL 480 counterpart, for example, foregoing chance to go for new project loans and additional help. These demands will presumably be negotiable but in final analysis we must be prepared to be generous.

13. All this being said I found Prime Minister Erim’s words most encouraging and I think we can proceed with greater confidence that some solution to opium problem in Turkey at any rate is attainable. Goes without saying public premature disclosure gist of our proposals and of Prime Minister’s positive reaction must be avoided.

Handley

447. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Turkish Position on Opium

Before returning for your meeting on narcotics,² Ambassador Handley met with Turkish Prime Minister Erim and his top advisers on opium.³ As of now, their position—which is still subject to further evolution—includes these elements:

- A major effort underway to collect this year's harvest.
- Passage of the licensing and control bill assured by June 30.
- Reduction of this fall's planting from seven provinces to four with the strong possibility that the government, before the end of June, will announce that production of opium after the 1971 planting season will no longer be in the hands of private farmers but might, if not eliminated altogether, be confined to one province on state farms only.

Handley notes that the precise Turkish position is still under discussion in Ankara. The issue seems to be how far they can announce now that 1972 plantings will be cut back. One proposal is to allow legal planting in one or two provinces; another is to allow it only in one and there on state farms. The procedure being adopted in the three provinces to be eliminated this fall is a subsidy to be paid to former growers and the introduction of labor-intensive industry, e.g. apparel, leather and industry based on animal husbandry. Following Handley's expression of deep disappointment that they could not take a dramatic step now, the Turks after this meeting sent him a revised plan which would add voluntary elimination of planting and compensation in the four remaining provinces this year if the US were able to cover financing for the compensation scheme.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum, and there is no indication that the President saw it.

² See Document 448.

³ As reported in telegram 4090 from Ankara, June 12. (Ibid.) Handley arranged this meeting in response to an instruction from the Department, in telegram 100799 to Ankara, June 8, that he give Erim a personal message from Nixon expressing the President's concern with the heroin problem in the United States. (Ibid.) In the message the President explained U.S. domestic efforts to attack the problem and asked that Erim respond with decisive action to proposals suggested by Handley on May 17; see Document 446.

This first Turkish position does not go as far as we had hoped it would. However, the government for the first time is seriously engaged in the problem and in developing a position for moving on a broad front. While there are some hardliners, the Prime Minister seems well disposed toward our view. There is now room for negotiation of a solid step forward—even if not all we would like—before the end of the month. It seems important to give this negotiation every chance.

448. Memorandum for the President's File¹

Washington, June 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassadors and State Department Officials on International Narcotics Trafficking, June 14, 1971, 10:10 a.m.–11:45 a.m.

The President opened the meeting by saying that the presence of senior members of the Cabinet, plus Ambassadors of five countries underlines the importance the President places on the drug problem. The Administration's program will emphasize reduction in the supply of dangerous drugs through the arrest and prosecution of pushers, treatment of addicts and education programs.

The President placed the drug problem in the perspective of a national rather than a military problem. He pointed out that the problem of supply of heroin is outside of the U.S., for the U.S. does not produce any opium poppy.

[Omitted here is discussion of the domestic drug problem and heroin in Southeast Asia.]

Ambassador Handley briefed on the subject of U.S./Turkey relations and the long history, dating back to 1932, of negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey on the reduction of poppy cultivation. In 1967, there were 21 provinces in Turkey cultivating poppy. By 1971, the number of provinces was reduced to 7; and in 1972, the provinces will be reduced to 4. It is noted that these 4 provinces are the most productive. Where the Government of Turkey has banned the cultivation of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President. No classification marking. Drafted by Krogh.

the poppy, this ban has been effective. In fact, the number of acres in production went up [down?] from 1970 over 1968.

The U.S. policy is to have Turkey eradicate completely its poppy crop. Prime Minister Demirel tried to do this over 4 to 5 years, but was not successful. Prime Minister Erim also wants to eradicate the poppy crop.

By the end of June of 1971, there will be an announcement from the Government of Turkey that only 4 provinces will be allowed to cultivate the poppy starting in September of 1971. Unprecedented efforts have been made by the Government of Turkey to buy up the crop. Ambassador Handley expressed some reason for optimism.

Ambassador Handley suggested that \$50 million over the next 3 or 4 years would suffice to get Turkey out of poppy production. The Government of Turkey is concerned, however, that the farmer be given a better life.

President Nixon asked whether Prime Minister Erim could move immediately in eradicating poppy cultivation with this \$50 million. The President suggested that we could not wait 3 or 4 years to end poppy cultivation. The President asserted that it is worth \$50 million to the United States if we can get it done. The President asserted that the United States will not be blackmailed, but he is willing to pay the price that must be paid in order to eradicate the poppy.

Ambassador Handley stated that the Prime Minister must give a one-year notice before he can tell the Turkish farmers that they cannot plant the poppy. This is a legal requirement.

Secretary Connally suggested that the crop could be purchased for \$3 million. Ambassador Handley said that the Turks use the oils from the poppies for other industrial purposes and that there is no addiction to speak of in Turkey. He feels that the Prime Minister must be able to offer the farmers something better than poppy production, for instance sugar beets or onion plants. There is also discussion of the possibility of constructing textile plants so that textiles can be shipped to the U.S.

Secretary Richardson stated that the production of poppy has a cultural meaning for the Turks, for in 1969 the U.S. pharmaceutical companies were going to buy up the entire crop. Secretary Richardson asked why, if India can prevent diversion, cannot the Turks.

Ambassador Handley replied that in India a farmer is denied a license if he claims that he had a small crop. The rationale is that the farmer is either a liar or a poor farmer.

Ambassador Handley speculated that within 2 years there should be a total end of production of poppy in Turkey.

President Nixon stated that Congress could cut all foreign aid to Turkey because of the drug problem in the United States.

The President instructed that we explore at the very highest levels:

1. What would be the price to buy the Turkish poppy crop.
2. Will that work to effectively stop illicit diversion.

The President said that we should not pay a high price for something not worth the price. However, the price is cheap now because the price later can be the destruction of our NATO alliance.

Secretary Richardson stated that whatever the cost is, Congress will pay the bill if we can be assured that the crop can be eradicated.

Ambassador Handley stated that the Turks cannot buy the crop and control the crop this year; that we should take the toughest stand next year and demand total secession [*cessation*] of production.

The President remarked that Thailand, Laos and Turkey cannot control their own territories and therefore control of production would be difficult. The President admitted that part of the problem is that Americans demand heroin and we must educate our own people. He stated that marihuana gets young people into the drug culture and then it become easier to move on to heroin.

Ambassador Handley stated that he was convinced that Prime Minister Erim is trying to manage and curtail poppy production and that Turkey should not be singled out for retribution or criticism.

President Nixon stated that it would be interesting to know how many addicts enter Vietnam and how many addicts leave Vietnam who are not theretofore addicted to heroin.

Ambassador Handley felt that it would not be wise to accept Secretary Rogers' suggestion that the President send a letter to Prime Minister Erim asking that production of poppy is terminated. The Ambassador felt that the Prime Minister could not comply and therefore there would be needless tension between the President and the Prime Minister.

President Nixon asked that the Secretaries of State, Agriculture and Treasury and the Attorney General get together to decide whether the subsidy being paid by the Turkish Government to the farmers is adequate and whether we can purchase better performance. The President said that he is willing to spend \$50 million in one year if that will do the job.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of the domestic drug problem.]

449. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

Opium Eradication in Turkey

Following your meeting on June 14 on narcotics,² Ambassador Handley has had a series of exchanges with Turkish Prime Minister Erim and his key Cabinet advisers as a result of which the GOT has agreed to issue a decree no later than June 30, 1971, announcing that opium poppy cultivation will no longer be permitted after this year's planting (under the present law the Turks are committed to four provinces for the Fall 1971 planting); i.e., eradication effective in the Fall of 1972.³ As instructed, Ambassador Handley has indicated in return our willingness to extend assistance to meet foreign exchange losses to the Turkish Government and to help compensate farmers for their loss of income for a transition period of three (with a possible stretchout to four) years, for which a grant of up to \$15 million would be available.⁴ A program of voluntary abstention from planting in the final year could increase this somewhat. In addition, we would pledge grant aid of \$10 million for FY 1972 and \$10 million for FY 1973 to assist the Turkish Government program to restructure the economy of the opium producing area in order to provide a new way of life for the families involved. We have also agreed to enlist the cooperation of international organizations and private foundations to help Turkey in this effort.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret.

² See Document 448.

³ In telegram 4337 from Ankara, June 21, Handley reported on a "long and frank discussion" with Erim on June 21 at which time Erim agreed to the three U.S. proposals: complete eradication by June 1972, full purchase of the current opium crop by Turkey, and legislation making poppy farming illegal provided that the United States was prepared to provide long term assistance to farmers affected by the ban on poppy growing. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971) In telegram 4302 from Ankara, June 24, the Embassy reported that Turkish experts were floating \$400 million as the figure for compensation for lost opium production. (Ibid.)

⁴ In telegram 113776 to Ankara, June 24, Rogers and Sisco stated that "the idea of including substantial compensation for assumed losses from illicit production is unconscionable." They suggested the figures cited here. (Ibid.) In telegram 4439 from Ankara, June 24, Handley reported that he and Erim had reached preliminary agreement on these terms. (Ibid.)

The Prime Minister feels that it is a key element of his proposal to have a public statement by you after the Turkish decree is issued and his own statement is made explaining his decision to the Turkish people. He would like to see included in your statement the following: reassurances of U.S. friendship; full recognition of his Government's efforts to control and eradicate opium; a promise of U.S. help in the affected areas, including enlisting the help of international organizations and private foundations; and a reiteration that military collaboration between the U.S. and Turkey will continue. Erim has also suggested that he would like to have a high-level agricultural mission to assist and advise in the basic agrarian reforms his Government will propose.

On June 26, in his last meeting with Ambassador Handley, Prime Minister Erim said he wished you to know that you have a reliable ally in Turkey, and that in the end it was not money but friendship that induced him to make the decision for eradication.

Recommendation

1. That you confirm the financial arrangements that would provide a total grant of up to \$35 million (\$15 million in a three-year compensation program and \$10 million for investment in each year of FY 1972 and 1973).

2. That you approve the statement in the attached telegram, along the lines suggested by Prime Minister Erim, to be issued shortly after the Turkish decision is announced.

3. That you endorse in principle sending a high-level agricultural mission to Turkey, with the details and timing to be worked out later.

The Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General and the Administrator for AID concur in these recommendations, which reflect the discussions in a conference attended by the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, where agreement was reached on the instructions for Ambassador Handley.⁵

William P. Rogers

⁵ Nixon approved these recommendations and the statement. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, June 28; *ibid.*, Box 358, Subject Files, Narcotics, (1971) Vol. IV)

450. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, June 30, 1971, 1215Z.

4518. For the Secretary from Handley. Subj: Narcotics: Meeting With Foreign Minister Olcay. Ref: A) State 116137; B) Ambassador's telcons with NEA/TUR and Egil Krogh, White House, June 29.²

Summary: Foreign Minister and I, at virtually last minute session at his residence June 29, reached agreement that Turkey would, after fall of 1972, no longer grow opium poppy. We agreed on few relatively minor changes in USG proposal contained reftel. This in no way altered basic fact that for grants of about \$35 million over three-four year period, GOT will grow no more poppies after harvesting of crop to be planted this coming fall and spring. *End summary.*

1. At end of long day during which we were in almost constant contact with GOT officials, I met at 1930 with Foreign Minister Olcay. At end of meeting, we had arrived at agreement on eradication of Turkish opium as of fall of 1972.

2. Meeting of one hour and 45 minutes took place at Foreign Minister's official residence. FonMin Deputy Dir Gen Arim was with Olcay; Hill, Toner and Greene came with me.

3. Olcay had just returned that morning from three-day official visit to Iran and was not, therefore, fully briefed on our June 26 meeting with Prime Minister Erim nor on other weekend developments. I opened meeting by giving him copy of proposed statement by President Nixon (State 116136).³ Our discussions about it were useful in bringing Olcay up to date.

4. In lengthy review of proposed Presidential statement, Olcay had two broad problems: a) he said Prime Minister would want more specifics about long range assistance and b) he wondered what would happen if the two grants of \$10 million each were not enough "to take care of the problem." To first point, we noted Presidential messages are never detailed and we thought this was unusually strong one. He agreed. I reminded Olcay that message covered all subjects which Erim had wanted.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² Telegram 116137, June 29, set out U.S. understanding of the terms of the agreement with Turkey on opium planting suppression. (Ibid.) No record of the telephone discussions with either NEA/TUR or Krogh was found.

³ Dated June 29. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO-DRUGS-TUR)

5. As for money, I reminded him that what was involved was \$10–\$15 million to compensate farmers and cover foreign exchange losses (noting that this was now for three–four year period) and \$10 million grant in each of FY 72 and 73. “This amounts to maximum of \$35 million for a fraction of your farmers who are fractionally engaged in poppy farming.” I concluded that seemed generous offer to me. Olcay said he personally also thought the two \$10 million grants would be sufficient, but “others” disagreed. As I had said to Erim on June 26, the opium issue now encompassed entire range of US-Turk relations. “\$35 million is not small amount when you consider what else Turkey is getting.”

6. We then turned to slightly expurgated version of my instructions (paras 2–10 reftel) which we had informally shown to Erim at Foreign Ministry that morning. On request for legislation banning further opium poppy cultivation (para 3 reftel), Olcay said he found suggestion “undemocratic.” He asked “How can govt in democratic country promise to pass a bill?” After discussing several word changes, we suggested and Olcay accepted “undertake to seek enactment of legislation banning further opium poppy production.”

7. Turning to amounts of money listed in paras 4 and 5 of reftel, Olcay reviewed his and Prime Minister’s doubts about longer range. “How can you make promise of precise long range assistance?” I reminded him of many Congressional proposals to cut off aid to Turkey because of opium production.

8. Foreign Minister said he was worried about \$10–\$15 million range and possibility lower figure might be used. Likewise he was not convinced that full \$20 million grant would be forthcoming from other two amounts. I then agreed that three amounts could read “minimum of \$15 million,” “minimum of \$10 million,” and “minimum of \$10 million,” on understanding this did not in any sense commit US to any higher figure but would help GOT presentationally in explaining US undertaking to Turkish political leaders.

9. Olcay then brought up one of most familiar Turkish themes in our discussions—necessity to earn, over long run, foreign exchange equal to that now earned by opium. He reported that Deputy Prime Minister Karaosmanoglu still believes that this is a crucial point and that investments replacing opium must include factories for such things as shoes which could then be exported to US and elsewhere. Toner reminded Olcay of our earlier proposal related to onion and garlic dehydration plant and said AID studies indicated there would be good market for such products in Europe. As means of meeting GOT concern without expanding US commitment, we agreed on adding at end of para 4 following phrase: “and help create new sources of foreign exchange.” This seemed satisfy Olcay.

10. There were no problems with paras 6 and 7 reftel. Olcay did note that Erim considers visit by agricultural experts important.

11. Re para 8, we discussed timing of statements to be made on June 30. Later that night, after Arim brought us copy of Prime Minister's statement, we agreed on following: GOT decree (Ankara 4498),⁴ to be released during morning June 30; Prime Minister's statement (Ankara 4499)⁵ to be released at noon June 30 Ankara time and to be reported on Radio Ankara news reports; President Nixon's statement to be made at noon Washington time (subsequently changed on basis telcon to 0900 Washington time), which would mean it could be reported on 1900 radio news program, Ankara time.

12. Olcay professed not to understand para 9 (re proposed further grant if voluntary program in 1971–72 season at least 35 percent successful). He had earlier mentioned "35 percent" in telephone conversation with me and we had agreed that word "significant" might be better than using actual figure. We now confirmed that earlier agreement.

13. Olcay wondered about condition in para 10. I replied "If there 100 tons of illegal opium from this year's crop, President Nixon would have great difficulties in explaining to American public any assistance to GOT." Olcay replied he not objecting to principle stated there, but perhaps to grammar, but he then passed on to other subjects.⁶

14. Arim then gave us advance copies of Turkish decree which GOT would issue June 30 and gave oral summary in English. He promised to bring copies of Prime Minister's statement to my residence later in evening.

15. *Comment:* After I read Prime Minister's statement brought to residence by Arim late last night, after my meeting with Olcay, I and my colleagues felt that he had said as eloquently and persuasively as anyone could why Turkey should permanently prohibit poppy planting beginning in the fall of 1972. In terms of overall figures, I made no concessions, but in conversations with NEA/TUR and in telephone call I received from Deputy Assistant to President Krogh, I identified those specific changes from my instructions which I felt were necessary to close the deal. The issuance this morning of the decree, the first

⁴ Dated June 30. (Ibid.)

⁵ Dated June 30. (Ibid.)

⁶ In telegram 4641 from Ankara, July 7, Handley noted the desire of Turkish officials for a written statement outlining the terms of the U.S.-Turkish agreement and proposed wording for such a statement that he could deliver to Erim. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971) The Department of State granted authorization for the letter in telegram 127415 to Ankara, July 15. (Ibid.)

substantive paragraph of which proclaims to all of Turkey the definite forbidding of the planting and production of the poppy within the borders of Turkey beginning with the autumn of 1972, seems to me to be a statement which countries other than Turkey may well consider and makes me proud of the courage shown by the present leadership in Turkey in taking such a giant step.

16. I do hope that the suggestions I made in last para Ankara 4441⁷ to encourage prominent American personalities to make public congratulatory statements about Turkey's historic decision can be given high priority. It is my impression that the Prime Minister would like to be internationally recognized for an act that he considers to be a major contribution to humanity.

Handley

⁷ Dated June 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS–TUR)

451. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 29–2–71

Washington, December 2, 1971.

[A prefatory note reads: "This estimate examines prospects for Turkey against the background of deep-seated social and economic issues which are profoundly affecting Turkish domestic and to a lesser extent foreign affairs. In assessing political matters it gives emphasis to developments between now and 1973 when parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held."]

TURKEY'S PROSPECTS

Conclusions

A. Turkey's intractable social and economic problems threaten the multiparty political system erected over the past 50 years. The Justice

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R1012A, NIEs and SNIEs. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted it with the concurrence of all members of the USIB, except the representatives of FBI and AEC who abstained on the grounds it was outside their jurisdiction. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this estimate superseded NIE 29.2–70, Document 428.

Party, which represents the political alliance between the rising business and professional groups on the one hand and the more modern peasants on the other, wins elections. It cannot rule, however, without the acquiescence of the military elite and the bureaucratic reformers represented by the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), which governed Turkey until 1950. While the RPP leadership remains committed to democratic procedures, the military establishment takes seriously its role as protector of the regime against internal as well as external enemies and has intervened twice in the decades since the Second World War to bring down the government. The basic conflict of interest between these forces is not susceptible to early or easy solution.

B. Prime Minister Erim, though brought to office by military intervention, is no mere puppet of the generals. He is pledged to restore law and order and to carry out a wide ranging program of reform—involving principally land reform and strengthening the executive power of government. He is likely to accomplish very little of his ambitious program, however, and political tension will probably continue high.

C. The military establishment will almost certainly remain the final arbiter of Turkey's politics for many years to come. But if civilian politicians cooperate to pass some reform measures, the present military leadership is unlikely to seize direct power. If a military government is established, however, it is likely to be long-lasting. The senior generals would probably continue many of the Erim government's policies; a regime dominated by lower ranking officers would be more nationalistic in outlook and less predictable in direction.

D. Turkey is now engrossed in a debate on its place in the world. Many Turks feel that they have long been taken for granted by the US. Thanks to martial law the loudest critics of the US have been silenced and the climate for US activities in Turkey has somewhat improved under the Erim regime. [6 lines not declassified]

E. Measures to control opium are also linked to US assistance; and the Turks have expectations for substantial and continuing aid that are likely to be very hard for the US to meet. If US economic aid declines and indications appear that opium growers in other countries are increasing production, pressures inside Turkey to continue production would rise significantly. There is potential here for a clash of interests with the US on an issue which touches Turkish national sensibilities.

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]

452. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, January 4, 1972, 2335Z.

1186. Subject: Visit of Turk FonMin: MAP/F-4 Sale to Greece. Following is uncleared and subject to revision:

1. *Summary*: Turk FonMin Bayulken paid brief call on Secretary Rogers in his office before attending working luncheon which Secretary gave for him. Also present during call were Turk Ambassador Esenbel, newly-arrived Turk Embassy Counselor Yegen, AsstSec Sisco and Country Director Dillon. Bayulken presented letter from President Sunay addressed to President Nixon and asked Secretary to deliver. (Text being sent to Ankara by septel.)² *End summary*.

2. Letter describes Turkey as surrounded by Soviet Union, Bulgaria and countries of “dubious friendship like Syria and Iraq.” Says that Turk neighbors being supplied “latest modern armaments,” thus “possibility of concerted attack on Turkey” increases danger to south-east flank of NATO. Letter adds there no prospect peaceful solution in near future to Arab-Israeli conflict or Cyprus problem. Soviet Union exploits both these questions in order to establish “firm military and political foothold in area,” and “claims right of exercising influence in Mediterranean where she maintains considerable naval presence.” Turkey while seeking to maintain democracy and realize economic development is making sacrifices in order to play an effective part in NATO. Turkey, however, not in position to provide for defense against threat described above through her own resources and Sunay asks President to take “close look into defensive preparedness of Turkey so that our close cooperation in this field be continued without being allowed to be jeopardized and imperiled with considerations of economy.” Letter then refers to proposed visit of Prime Minister Erim, concluding that during that visit “common problems and concerns” can be reviewed.

3. At following luncheon, Secretary, noting that Congress had not taken final action on security assistance and consequently he did not know what final MAP figures would look like, observed that judging from letter GOT’s primary concerns were security and military aid matters. Bayulken agreed. He observed that Iraq and Syria had “500 mod-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Dillon; cleared in NEA, PM/MAS, EUR/RPM, and S; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, Sofia, USUN, USNATO, Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, SecDef, JCS, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSOUTH.

² Transmitted in telegram 1442 to Ankara, January 5. (Ibid.)

ern planes." Furthermore it was the judgement of analysts that "they" (presumably the Bulgarians) could "thrust to Istanbul in five days." This had to be a concern to all members of NATO. Furthermore, there was "naturally a certain anxiety on our part relating to news (concerning MAP) from the Congress."

4. Bayulken then expressed GOT's concern about possible sale of F-4's to Greece. These planes, which could range over Turkey and Cyprus and safely return to bases in Greece, would alter delicate balance between Greece and Turkey which had existed since Lausanne and which had been "kept by NATO." GOT appreciated Greek needs, but Greeks did not need F-4's. Bulgarian border close and short range aircraft would suffice. Furthermore, Greek possession of F-4's might also have effect on solution to Cyprus, i.e. GOG might be less willing to pursue compromise solution. Secretary then asked question about Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations, and discussion shifted to Cyprus (septel).³

Rogers

³ Apparent reference to telegram 805 to Nicosia, January 3. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 2 CYP)

453. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, March 1, 1972.

SUBJECT

Advanced Aircraft for Greece and Turkey

During the past few months the Greek Government has moved steadily toward the purchase of a significant number of advanced aircraft from the US (you approved the sale of F-4's to Greece in October 1970). The imminence of this sale has had a galvanic effect on official attitudes in both Greece and Turkey, and we expect the issue to figure prominently in discussions with Prime Minister Erim of Turkey when he visits Washington next month.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75-0009, T-87 F-4 Greece/F-5 Turkey. Secret.

If Greece buys advanced aircraft either from the US or France, we anticipate a sharp reaction in Turkey where in addition to an acute awareness of Turkish versus Warsaw Pact tactical air deficiencies, any change in the relative balance of Greek-Turkish forces poses both real and psychological problems. The situation will likely be exacerbated by a significant reduction in US military aid in FY 1972. Moreover, implementation of the proposed USN and USAF homeporting and basing arrangements in Greece and Crete could pose a further irritant.

The Turks already perceive what they believe to be actions which will give the Greeks a military capability they heretofore have not possessed. When the USN and USAF proposals become public, it is likely the Government of Turkey, and Turkish public opinion, will conclude that we have decided to root the preponderance of our interests in the eastern Mediterranean in Greece. They may further conclude that these moves are to be followed by a more general shift of US policy to favor Greece at Turkey's expense. We cannot predict with any confidence the ultimate consequence of such a Turkish perception, but it could well involve an adverse impact on valuable US [*less than 1 line not declassified*] military rights in Turkey.

The requirement to modernize Turkey's Air Force is equal to, if not greater, than that of Greece. Although part of Turkey's modernization requirement could be met by provision of F-5E aircraft, a valid need remains for all-weather fighter aircraft such as the F-4. ISA is currently reviewing world-wide air modernization requirements with a view to isolating the funding problem for priority attention within the military security assistance program. It is unlikely, however, that this problem can be resolved prior to the FY-74 budget cycle.

In the meantime, we believe that despite the cost and complexity of the F-4's, their psychological significance to the Turks could become so great that we must now weigh certain options that might be available to retain Turkish cooperation if the F-4 sale to Greece is consummated. In evaluating such options it must be understood that their feasibility is dependent upon sufficient grant/FMS funds being available to the Department of Defense. The options, with pros and cons, that might be considered are as follows:

Option I. Continue with the F-5E program for Turkey which would fund 72 aircraft (4 squadrons) in the FY-74/75 timeframe and provide delivery during FY 76-77.

Pros

Would satisfy modernization requirement for 4 fighter squadrons.

Provides new versus used or rehabilitated aircraft; thus the life span is longer, certainly is less costly and easier to maintain and operate than F-4 series.

Provides maximum quantitative modernization at given cost. (\$115 million buys 4 squadrons of F-5's; one squadron of F-4's costs \$120 million.)

Cons

Turkey might not be satisfied with anything less than F-4's if Greeks get F-4's.

If an "F-5 or nothing" deal offered to Turks, they might reject and turn to the French Mirage.

Option II. In addition to 4 squadrons of F-5E's (or as offset to the provision of 1 or 2 of these squadrons), divert F-4C and D's to meet Turkish requirement when the 23 F-4E's currently on loan to Australia are returned (FY 73-74) to the USAF inventory.

Pros

Would assuage Turkish feelings, and weaken case for Greek-Turk imbalance.

From the standpoint of Turk ability to "fly" F-4's, they would very likely be more successful with F-4C and D's than the F-4E.

Cons

F-4C and D's freed by returning F-4E's are intended for U.S. Air National Guard; diversion would delay modernization of ANG.

F-4 aircraft are expensive to operate and maintain and, in terms of money and technology, would impose severe demands on Turk resources.

Diversion of Turkish funds to an F-4 purchase program could jeopardize other important armed forces modernization efforts.

Heavy investment in F-4's would stimulate requests and demands for additional grant assistance to compensate for the drain on resources.

Would irritate the Greeks because they were not first offered a "used" F-4 squadron at a bargain price.

Option III. In addition to 4 squadrons of F-5E's (or as offset to the provision of 1 or 2 of these squadrons), utilize the 23 F-4E's from Australia to fulfill the Turkish requirement.

Pro

Would enable F-4E's to be included in both Turk and Greek inventories thus maintaining "balance."

Cons

Would deprive USAF of anticipated update in F-4E inventory, and ANG update in F-4C/D inventory.

Increased sophistication of F-4E would severely tax Turk resources. As a combat “package,” the 23 F-4E’s would be considerably more effective in the USAF.

Would irritate Greeks because they were not offered “used” F-4E squadron at a bargain price.

Recommendations

I. On balance, I believe the F-5E would be a more suitable aircraft for the Turks than would the F-4. Moreover, provision of this aircraft would be in consonance with current projections in the overall F-5E program. Accordingly, appreciating the variables involved, and in line with existing guidance to the Country Team, if approached by the Turks, we should promote the F-5E. In lieu of attempting to discourage the Turks from acquiring the F-4 aircraft, we would make arrangements for JUSMMAT to brief the Turks on the cost factors of the two aircraft and let the Turks make their own decision. Hopefully the disparity in costs, paucity of Turkish resources and dwindling world-wide MAP grant resources might persuade the Turks to opt for the F-5E.²

II. In the event the Greek F-4 sale is consummated, we recognize that the Turks may not be satisfied with anything less than F-4’s. In this circumstances, it is also possible that USG interests would dictate that we make available F-4’s to the Turks. Therefore, we should, without reference to the Turks, commence now to identify possible sources of F-4’s that might be made available and the essential balancing program adjustments. To this end, it is recommended that we request USAF views relative to Options II and III above. We would seek also information regarding other all-weather aircraft that might be considered as possible alternatives.³

III. West Germany for a number of years has provided a measure of military aid to Turkey and has shown real sympathy for Ankara’s lack of resources to meet pressing modernization needs. In view of the FRG’s major F-4 procurement program, I propose that we explore Bonn’s willingness to assist the Turks in this area, perhaps by providing German-produced components as grant aid or by facilitating a Turkish buy by offering long term, low-interest credit.⁴

G. Warren Nutter

² Secretary Laird initialed the approval option on March 3. In a March 31 letter to Prime Minister Erim, Laird suggested a briefing by U.S. officials comparing the costs and performance of the two aircraft. (Ibid., FRC 330 75–0125, 000.1–333 Turkey, 1972)

³ Secretary Laird initialed the approval option on March 3.

⁴ Secretary Laird initialed the approval option on March 3 and added by hand: “after trying No. I.”

454. Memorandum for the President's File¹

Washington, March 21, 1972, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Nihat Erim of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon

Prime Minister Nihat Erim

Mr. Celal Akbay (Director General of the Department of Research and Policy
Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey)

Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The meeting opened with the press photographs.

President Nixon then began the conversation by expressing his pleasure that the Prime Minister's visit could be arranged. The meeting was especially significant, the President added, coming as it did between his Peking and Soviet trips.²

The President noted the difficulties which Turkey's extended border with unfriendly and potentially unfriendly powers involved. He stated that he would visit Turkey at some time in the future. Turkey had always been a great ally of the United States and a loyal and important member of the NATO Alliance. He noted that this was near the first anniversary of the Prime Minister's tenure.

Prime Minister Erim wished to touch upon the internal situation in Turkey. A kind of subtle subversion, which remained active and virulent, was the main issue for his Premiership. While external intimidation could not succeed because of Turkey's strong NATO ties, subversion did—as it did in Czechoslovakia—present a serious threat to his country's viability. On 9 March 1971, there had been a systematic effort to overthrow the forces of stability and democracy in Turkey. There were attempts at assassination and kidnapping, with the activity and leadership coming from the universities and even the high schools. It was at this time that the Armed Forces of Turkey took over and asked the Prime Minister to govern. Shortly thereafter, the Israeli Consul General was murdered, banks were being robbed at the rate of one a week, and political kidnapping continued. For this reason, martial law had to be adopted in six of Turkey's regions.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Turkey, Turkey Prime Minister Erim, March 21, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Haig. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Erim made an official visit to the United States March 21–22. Briefing papers for the President concerning the visit are *ibid.*

² The President visited China February 18–27 and the Soviet Union May 22–30.

Since that time, the situation had improved but it was still dangerous. Subversion continued.

The Prime Minister emphasized that he was strongly in favor of democratic processes in Turkey. For this reason, he was frequently criticized as being too soft on extremist elements. Nevertheless, he remained determined to abide by the Constitution which provides for a Parliament and independent judiciary. The situation in Turkey did not draw its virulence from internal sources but was rather fed from abroad; there was a large Turkish "liberation movement" based in Stockholm, and activity also in East and West Germany. There were, in fact, some 500,000 Turkish citizens working in the Germanies.

President Nixon noted that they were valuable workers in labor-shortage areas. The Prime Minister agreed, but noted that they were also targets for subversion. There was even a subversive center among Turkish nationals in Palestine. The question was, who is behind it? While irrefutable evidence was lacking, logic could only suggest that it was supported by powers who wished to weaken Turkey and NATO. Last year's demonstrations against the Sixth Fleet were all the results of the leadership of international communism. Just this past week, 58 young officers were arrested due to their involvement in subversive activity. It was not simply a manifestation of youthful revolutionaries who have been captured by the philosophies of Mao, Marx or Guevara. The virulence of the movement and its tactics suggested a far more sophisticated guiding hand.

For this reason, the Prime Minister continued, he was attempting to modernize Turkey's military forces. The morale of the military was essential to Turkey's stability, and a collapse of the military would be fatal. Nikita Khrushchev had long held that Communist takeovers would not be by direct military means but by the victory of internal Socialist forces. France and other countries had the same problem, and the main challenge for the West today was to disrupt these subversive efforts. Unfortunately, many of Turkey's friends did not grasp the seriousness of the problem. Within Turkey proper, the forces for democracy were timid and self-conscious, while the Marxists were militant and aggressive. The major force for stability remained the senior military.

President Nixon asked what the Prime Minister thought of the policies of the Greek Colonels. The Prime Minister replied that in his view Turkey's way was the right way. A military dictatorship had no long term viability and more often than not resulted in feuding among the military, with increasing risks of instability. The Turkish military was professional. It kept out of politics to the degree that this was possible. The Junta route was unstable.

Prime Minister Erim continued that Turkey, in addition to its subversion problem, was troubled by economic problems. Population

growth had been extremely high, and the territories bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria were backward and underdeveloped. Turkey's five-year plan was an effort to raise the standard of living, but much remained to be done. Turkey had even had to export laborers to foreign markets because of her rampant unemployment. Therefore the economic assistance of the United States was vital. This was not a plea for cash or credit, but primarily for investment and above all, know-how. For example, the discontinuation of the poppy crop was best compensated for not by cash but by new techniques for substitute crops. Turkey's program was now going well in this area.

President Nixon stated that the United States wanted to be as helpful as possible because it was most grateful to the Prime Minister and the Turkish people for their enlightened approach to this international problem.

The Prime Minister stated that he had been subjected to much criticism because of his decision on poppies. Nevertheless, it was a sound decision. On the 6th of March 1971, the Prime Minister read of the difficulties the American youth and society in general were having. Based on this appreciation, he barred opium and had now adopted a program of compensation for the farmers. The difficulty was that the farmers were demanding more in the way of compensation than they had ever received from the illicit traffic. Nevertheless, Turkey would succeed with this program. Another economic development program of great significance to Turkey, the Prime Minister continued, was the U.S. road mission of 1947, which had really established the basis for Turkey's internal road network. Similar assistance in the agricultural area would be a great legacy for the United States. Careful analysis confirmed that the military situation and security situation were closely linked with economic viability, and when the young military saw that the country was growing and prospering, its morale was high and its loyalty unquestioning. Nevertheless, the task ahead was severe. It would not be until 1995 that Turkey could hope to achieve the level of individual income of Italy today. Turkey would not be a full member of the European Economic Community until 1995. The Prime Minister mentioned that he would see the World Bank President, Mr. McNamara, tomorrow morning and would impress upon him Turkey's need for investment, not charity.³

President Nixon expressed his appreciation for the Prime Minister's analysis. It was insufficient merely to look at surface problems. The realities of Turkey's economic situation must be understood. The President then directed General Haig to contact Mr. McNamara and

³ No record of this meeting was found.

urge him to take a most sympathetic view of Turkey's problem. He instructed General Haig to contact Secretary Connally and be sure that Secretary Connally or Mr. Volcker spent 15 minutes with the Prime Minister in an effort to better understand his problems and be of assistance. In addition, General Haig was to contact Dr. Hannah of AID to be sure that Dr. Hannah contacted a member of the Prime Minister's Delegation to outline what additional specific steps could be taken in the agricultural area to assist Turkey.⁴

The President pointed out that the current mood of the U.S. Congress was one of isolation. For example, the FY 1972 grant military aid package for Turkey had been cut from \$100 million to \$60 million. The President was now seeking to restore this cut or to find other means of compensating for the Congressional action. The United States was interested in Turkey not only because of its key NATO role but because of the importance of Turkey's internal stability. Military assistance was important, but so was economic assistance and technical advice, as well as support from international lending bodies. The United States was prepared to give all possible help along this broad front.

The President then said he would like to turn from specific problems to more general ones. The world was in a very dangerous period. The non-Communist world panted for peace. False euphoria could result from Presidential trips to Moscow and Peking. Nevertheless, these trips were being undertaken without any illusions about Chinese or Soviet policies and goals. It was significant that the PRC in the communiqué did not omit the Chinese intention to support revolutionary movements.⁵ For this reason, the United States and the free world had to talk from strength. The NATO Alliance was as important as ever. The threat of subversion continued worldwide.

The critical question of modern times, the President said, was how the free world was to deal with détente. Free peoples derived hope from détente, and at such a time their fears diminished and unity consequently suffered. This was the phenomenon with which the free world must cope during periods of détente. Both the Prime Minister and the President obviously were aware of this problem, and the Prime Minister could be assured that when the United States President spoke with the Soviet leadership it would be with the full realization of this real-

⁴ In a March 21 memorandum to the President, Haig reported he had talked to McNamara who stated he would give his full support to Turkey's economic requests and also had contacted Hannah who would contact the Turkish Agriculture Minister. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Turkey, Turkey Prime Minister Erim, March 21, 1972)

⁵ For text of the February 27 communiqué, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 376–379.

ity. There were no illusions. Regardless of what agreements were arrived at, the Socialist camp has not abandoned its objective to take over through "peaceful means." It was no longer wisdom to confront this phenomenon, but our guard must remain strong and our economic base must be strengthened. The Soviets also had their problems. Eastern Europe was unsettled. The Soviets also worried about their flank with China, and the Soviets were uncomfortable with the U.S. initiative.

The U.S. policy was a deliberate one, the President emphasized. It sought good relations with both Moscow and Peking—not to concert with one against the other, but to maintain an even-handed approach with both. This was the cornerstone of United States policy. It must be based on real friendship between all peoples with similar philosophies. It must also be guided by self-interest, and it was obvious that similar philosophies generated mutuality of interest which could not be abandoned in search of improved relationships with potential enemies. Similar philosophies permitted a greater cooperation and trust. Therefore, Turkey must understand that the discussions with the Chinese and Soviet leaders would not be conducted at the expense of old and trusted friends. That was why the Prime Minister's visit to the United States between the two summits was so important. Turkey had been a staunch friend. It had stayed the hard course despite insurmountable odds. As long as the current leadership was in Washington, this would be the United States policy.

The Prime Minister called the President's China visit a masterful diplomatic stroke. He had heard President Nixon's voice at the time the announcement was made,⁶ when the President stated that America could no longer ignore 800 million Chinese. The Soviet Ambassador in Turkey was shaken by the announcement. But the Prime Minister knew precisely what President Nixon was doing. Turkey also knew that the United States could not let Turkey go Marxist. Turkey thought of itself as a "firewall" for the free world. It recognized that the United States could not lose this bastion. For this reason, Turkey was resolved to stay with the West but Turkey also needed military, economic, moral and social defenses. It had to overcome the danger of subversion or the free world would be faced with a *fait accompli*. The Turkish military now supported the Prime Minister, but there was strong propaganda seeking to overthrow the status quo. Thus, Turkey needed help, and all of its friends must be aware of Turkey's problems.

It was nothing less than a war—a moral war and not one with guns—but the need for concerted action was just as strong, the Prime

⁶ For text of the President's July 15, 1971, announcement, see *ibid.*, 1971, pp. 819–820.

Minister emphasized. The Soviets might agree to strategic arms limitations but they still sought the moral erosion of the free world. Germany was one of the Soviets' main targets, for it was an historic dagger pointed at the Soviet heart. The Turkish military were particularly concerned about Bulgarian armored divisions equipped with tanks with a range of 430 kilometers. The Turkish tanks provided by the United States could travel only 170 kilometers without refueling, and it took an armored division 10 hours to refuel. Thus, the Turkish military wanted longer range tanks. Iraq and Syria were also being equipped with modern Soviet armaments. The United States must not let the military assistance program lag.

President Nixon instructed General Haig to prepare a completely frank report on the relative capabilities of United States and Soviet-supplied armament.⁷

Prime Minister Erim noted that Communist propaganda maintained that the United States would not defend Turkey but would rather use Turkish blood to gain time. Turkey had structural problems with F-84 aircraft, and the Turkish military now wanted Phantoms. They were urging the Prime Minister to buy French Mysteres and Mirages if the United States sources was not forthcoming. Communist propaganda highlighted the obsolescence of Turkish military equipment. President Nixon commented that it was a standard line for the Communists to maintain that Turkey was a vassal of the United States.

The conversation then turned to Cyprus. Prime Minister Erim stated that Turkey was not seeking partition or a new solution. Turkey signed an agreement which it wanted respected. The new Greek Government was more enlightened on the problem, and Papadopoulos was anxious for good relations with Turkey. Good relations between Turkey and Greece strengthened NATO. Nevertheless, even though Cyprus was a small island, in 1959 and 1960 a mixed rule had been agreed to with mixed leadership and a mixed legislature.⁸ This was a good solution, for Makarios, who was little more than an 18th century chauvinist, had sought to upset the agreements. The Prime Minister had asked Secretary Rogers on his visit to Turkey to urge restraint on Makarios. The Archbishop had been the subject of Soviet flirtations; most recently, Czechoslovakian arms had been shipped to Cyprus. They fished in troubled waters.

⁷ No report was found. In a March 27 memorandum to the President, Haig reported that a study was underway. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73)

⁸ Reference is to the London Accords of February 1959; see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 765–775.

Compromise was the best answer today, the Prime Minister felt. Makarios and the Greeks were at odds, and the Greek Religious Council was after Makarios. Turkey tried to keep out of the quarrel, but now was the time to push Makarios to make a settlement. Turkey wanted nothing new but merely implementation of existing agreements. What was required was a just solution. The Prime Minister had raised this with Vice President Agnew and had asked the Vice President to express Turkey's views to the Greeks. The Vice President had made a fine impression in Ankara.

President Nixon pointed out that the United States had been trying to keep out of the internal affairs of Cyprus, although it was obvious that our interests converged. The problem was that we could not permit the Soviets to exploit this issue. The Prime Minister noted that 35% of the Cypriot vote was Marxist.

The Prime Minister then turned to the question of the Soviet fleet and the Straits. President Nixon remarked that the Soviets were not building their presence in the Mediterranean just to look at the beauties of Cairo. They wanted increased presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore the United States was maintaining a strong fleet presence of its own and resisting Soviet penetration. Certainly the Middle East crisis was far bigger than a dispute between the Arabs and Israelis. The stakes were the entire Mediterranean, Turkey and Africa. For this reason, we could not allow Soviet domination of the eastern Mediterranean.

The Prime Minister said that the Government of Turkey proclaimed a good-neighbor policy but this could be viable only so long as Turkey remained strong. For this reason the joint communiqué published in conjunction with this visit⁹ should include a strong declaration for Turkish independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. In 1947 it was the Truman Doctrine which saved Turkey. President Nixon said that he had voted for this policy. Dean Acheson, the President noted, had been the author of the so-called Truman Doctrine. Prime Minister Erim said that President Johnson had departed from it.

The Prime Minister mentioned that he had been a drafter of the Cypriot Constitution.

The Prime Minister then told the President that Pakistan's President Bhutto had visited Ankara recently. The Prime Minister had asked Bhutto about his attitude towards CENTO. Bhutto's reply was that it depended on the United States. President Nixon instructed General Haig to be sure that President Bhutto was aware of our support. He had just reiterated this support to the new Secretary-General of

⁹ The Joint Statement, March 22, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Nixon*, 1972, pp. 460-461.

CENTO. The President added that CENTO was no longer a purely military organization but it was no less important because of its symbolic significance.

The Prime Minister informed the President that Turkey would recognize Bangladesh in April. President Nixon replied that the United States would also recognize Bangladesh after Indian troops had left its territory. Bangladesh, the Prime Minister pointed out, was now the largest Muslim country in the world. The President felt that the policies of Turkey and the United States were parallel with respect to Pakistan. During the recent crisis in South Asia, U.S. policy had saved West Pakistan.

Prime Minister Erim stated that he would see Soviet President Podgorny in April and that Podgorny would wish to proclaim a good-neighbor policy and non-aggression treaty. Turkey, however, would reply that as a member of NATO it would not enter into unilateral arrangements with the Soviet Union. Despite this, the Soviets would probably continue, as in the past, to press Turkey for a non-aggression pact. Failing that, they would press for a consultation arrangement, but here again Turkey could not check each of its moves with the Soviet Union. Turkey would stay within the Alliance framework and merely accept a good-neighbor statement. President Nixon thought this an excellent strategy. It was important that Turkey did not permit the Soviets to pick off an essential ingredient of the NATO flank.

As the meeting drew to a close, the President said that the two leaders could continue their discussion at the State dinner that evening. The Prime Minister thanked President Nixon for his hospitality, and said he had drawn great comfort from his discussions with the President. The President stated that this indeed was the right time for a visit from the Prime Minister. He reassured him that the United States was in Turkey's corner and would do all it can. The Prime Minister said that Turkey must be strong and bright like a star. This was the Prime Minister's goal, and for this Turkey needed the understanding of the United States. President Nixon stated that U.S. understanding would not come from compassion but self-interest. This was the underlying reality of continuing U.S.-Turkish cooperation.¹⁰

¹⁰ Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken held a simultaneous meeting with Rogers in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Accounts of their discussions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 TUR.

455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, July 10, 1972, 2145Z.

123988. Subject: Patriarch's Funeral. Ref: Ankara 4851.²

1. Evening of July 9 Turk Chargé Yegen telephoned NEA/TUR Director Dillon at home to say he had received instructions from Ankara to tell USG that decision re entry of Archbishop Iakovos had been reviewed at highest level of GOT; that Iakovos would not be permitted to enter Turkey; that Iakovos was ex-Turkish citizen who had lost citizenship and who had worked against best interests of Turkey; that his presence in Turkey during delicate period following death of Patriarch was considered particularly undesirable. Yegen added that "in our opinion" Iakovos wanted to gain entry in order to politick for succession to Patriarch, which was matter of "great sensitivity" in Turkey. Yegen then stressed that he under instructions to make clear that Greek Orthodox communicants, or church officials, other than Iakovos, were welcome to attend the funeral; his government hoped that the other members of the ecumenical delegation would feel free to come.³

2. With some embarrassment, Yegen then said that he had reported his informal conversations of July 7 and 8 with Dillon,⁴ and that he was instructed to say that Dillon's remarks on Saturday had been received with "astonishment and regret." Under probing Yegen said that the specific remarks were Dillon's reference to the possibility of negative press treatment in the United States, and to the possibility that Archbishop Iakovos might be coming to Istanbul without a visa.

3. Dillon replied that he was equally astonished at FonMin reaction. As Yegen knew his remarks had been in context of informal discussion of what kinds of problems might be presented by Turkish refusal to grant entry to Iakovos. Dillon pointed out that if representatives of friendly nations could not discuss these kinds of problems without

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Dillon and approved by Davies and Miller (S/S). Repeated to Istanbul.

² Dated July 9, it reported that Turkey had no objection to the attendance of a U.S. ecumenical delegation at the Patriarch's funeral but would not permit Archbishop Iakovos to enter Turkey. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 12–1 TUR)

³ In telegram 4847 from Ankara, July 9, Handley reported that he had presented the Turkish Government with an appeal to permit Iakovos to attend funeral services for the Patriarch who died July 7, noting that the Archbishop was an American citizen and the ranking member of his faith in North America and that "it was only natural for the Archbishop to want to pay respects to the spiritual leader of his faith." (Ibid.)

⁴ No record of these conversations was found.

words like “astonishment and regret” being used, there would be little communication. Yegen agreed and said he had reported to Ankara the informal nature of the discussion, but that the FonMin reply illustrated the great sensitivity in Ankara on the issue.

4. Dillon then informed Yegen that he understood that Iakovos was definitely not going, and that he also understood that other members of ecumenical delegation would almost certainly not go, although that was decision for each man to make separately. Dillon added that he had just heard that number of Greek-Orthodox communicants had applied for passports and would be going to Istanbul for funeral. He had also heard that there would be at least two chartered aircraft, one from Chicago and one from East Coast. Yegen replied that of course all such communicants were welcome “as long as they not on prescribed list,” and that he would pass information to Ankara.

Irwin

456. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

Ecumenical Patriarchate and Iakovos

Yesterday, Archbishop Iakovos sent Ambassador Bush a cable requesting his “immediate personal expression of protest to the United Nations in reaction to the unprecedented Turkish Government interference in the election of the Ecumenical Patriarch by virtue of their demands that the next Patriarch be approved by them and that elections be finalized within 72 hours.”²

The desirability of our continued non-involvement seems clear. The purpose of this memo is simply to give you the facts on the succession as they relate to Iakovos’ approach.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information.

² Attached but not printed.

The understandings between Greece and Turkey on the continued existence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul are a spin-off of understandings stated in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This provided, among other points, for the present Greek/Turkish border and for exchange of populations, including protection and rights of minorities which remained. The treaty does not mention the Patriarchate. However, the minutes of the Lausanne Conference do contain a discussion of the Patriarchate laying out Turkey's strong opposition to its continued presence in Turkey but also the UK appeal that Turkey not remove it. Thus, it was permitted to remain but has been under strong Turkish surveillance and control, including the custom of Turk veto over the selection of a patriarch as had been the case under the Sultan since 1862.

The main Turkish point being asserted in this situation, therefore, is that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a Turkish institution on Turkish soil and subject to Turkish law—not a Vatican with extraterritorial rights. The present episode began in 1970 when, in anticipation of Athenagoras' death and possibly the succession of another strong Patriarch, the Turkish government issued a memorandum setting forth guidelines for the selection of the new patriarch: The Holy Synod of bishops in the Patriarchate would convene, draw up a list of possible contenders within a set time and submit it to Istanbul's civilian Governor; he would edit it, removing offensive types and return it to the Synod. They would vote on remaining candidates which the Turks had approved.

This process has been going on since Athenagoras' funeral on Tuesday. We understand that the Holy Synod has submitted a list (which includes Meliton, the compromise candidate) to the Istanbul Governor after the Turks insisted they do so within 72 hours. The Turkish press says the Turks, after they edit the list, may be asking that the election take place within the next 72 hours. Finally, the Turk government has indicated publicly that if its election procedures are not followed it may have to appoint a new Patriarch though it has told our embassy in Ankara it wishes to avoid this.

This is the situation that Iakovos is reacting to. He claims the Turks cannot instruct the Church in election procedures which ordinarily would permit the Synod a much longer time to elect a new successor. Iakovos probably wants more time to lobby for support and the Turks want the matter to end quickly so that it does not become politicized. In any case, whatever the merits, Iakovos seems incorrect in saying that the Turkish government's involvement is "unprecedented." Not only have they been involved in practice—they seem to have assured the election of Athenagoras in 1948 by pressing other candidates to stand aside. The problem today is that they are blocking Iakovos.

Embassy Ankara says the Turks have told us they will insist on their procedures being followed but will not be heavy-handed in editing the list of candidates. The Greeks seem to accept this. They have played the affair in a very low key fashion throughout the last week. Leaving Iakovos aside, they have simply sought Turkish assurances that Church sensitivities be taken into account and they have made no *démarche* to the US or others. However, they would probably be upset if Meliton were dropped from the list or if the Turks felt compelled to appoint a new patriarch. For the moment, they seem to be letting matters take their own course to avoid a crisis in relations with Turkey.

One very remote legality Iakovos might resort to are the 1923 conventions concerning the rights of minorities—one element of which is respect for their religious practices. But this is rather way-out since the patriarchate has followed its own customary rules for years and very few go back to the 1923 general principles on minorities. However, Ankara is alert to this possibility. They told the Greeks they hoped they would not think of that route. The Greeks agreed and said they only wanted assurances Church sensitivities would generally be taken into account.

On Iakovos' protest that Turkey might have to select the Patriarch, Turkey has made clear that if the situation reaches that point they could amply justify it by pointing to Papadopoulos' brushing aside of Athens Holy Synod in 1967 and installing his own junta colleague as Patriarch of Athens.

The *issue for the US* is simply that the Turks have made their position clear and the Greeks themselves seem for the moment to be going along—since the future of the patriarchate itself could be at stake.

Ambassador Bush, understanding the pitfalls of our intervening, mainly wants to be sure we have covered the domestic political angle. He points out that any US approach to Waldheim would shortly get back to the Turks.

The fact is that the Turks for years have been harassing the Patriarchate, half wishing it would decide to withdraw. Given the Orthodox desire to stay in Istanbul, the Greeks at least seem to have resigned themselves to living with the situation. We are not likely to be able to change it.³

³ Vice President Agnew telephoned Kissinger on July 7 at 10:25 a.m. to discuss the issue of Archbishop Iakovos's attendance of the election of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Kissinger told Agnew that the Turkish Government considered it "a matter of great national interest not to permit him to come." Agnew and Kissinger agreed that it did not make sense to send an American church group that excluded the top Greek Orthodox churchman, but they agreed that there was little they could do. Agnew stated he would call Iakovos and tell him he had done everything he could, but he and the U.S. Government would have to withdraw from the matter in light of the Turkish stance. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 373, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

457. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 6, 1972, 1841Z.

Secto 60/3715. Memorandum of conversation: FM Bayulken (Turkey), October 5, 1972, 3:15 pm, 35A Waldorf.

1. Participants: Turkey—FM Bayulken; Ambassador Olcay, UN; Ambassador Akbay, ForMinistry; Ambassador Esenbel, US; US—The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, NEA, Mr. Davies, EUR, Mr. Hirshorn, NEA/TUR (reporting officer).

2. *Summary:* In his discussion with the Secretary FM Bayulken covered a broad range of subjects including the current political and economic situation in Turkey. He affirmed the Melen gov't's² determination to maintain the poppy ban and emphasized the internal threat from guerrilla organizations. Bayulken said that if the US maintains its current position on MBFR participation he would be forced to resign. Bayulken also asked continued US cooperation on military assistance, foreign aid, and several individual projects such as the Northrop F-5 co-production project, M-48 tanks and the purchase of ships which had been loaned to Turkey. The Secretary reaffirmed US appreciation for Turkey's courageous decision to prohibit poppy growing. He took note of Bayulken's points and said that US would do everything possible to be of help.

3. *Terrorism:* Bayulken began by referring to his speech in the GA on October 4.³ He said that he had agreed with the suggestions made to him by Amb Handley. He thought that the more successful approach to terrorism would be to take this issue up in the Political Committee and try to avoid the political aspects and concentrate on the practical problem of the acts of terrorism. He said he believed that the Turkish delegation could be of help. Bayulken also said that the Turkish Govt has received more evidence of centers of insurrection among Turks in West Germany, Sweden and perhaps even England and France. Bayulken said that since martial law was imposed surface terrorist elements have been controlled. However underground preparations are

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL TUR-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara. Secretary Rogers was in New York attending the UN General Assembly session.

² Prime Minister Erim resigned April 17 over the issue of extending government powers to combat terrorism. President Sunay appointed Defense Minister Ferit Melen to head an interim government the same day. After the failure of Suat Urganlı to form a government acceptable to the President, May 13, Sunay asked Melen to form a government, which he did on May 22.

³ For text, see UN doc. A/PV. 2053.

continuing. When the martial law is lifted these cells will come out into the open. He said that urban terrorism had not been supported by the peasants in Turkey. Therefore the terrorists are now looking to the unions. Most labor unions in Turkey are responsible but a small number are Communist oriented.

4. Economic Conditions: Bayulken said that the workers are relatively prosperous in Turkey where there is a high standard of living by ME standards. He said that the economy is good in spite of the fact that there have been three govts in the past two years. The private sector is beginning an upsurge. The state economic enterprises are slow to make profits but they have made good progress. Turkey is about to begin its third five year development plan and this will take close account of Turkey's transition agreement with the Common Market. Because of the high birth rate in Turkey the Turkish economy must provide one million new jobs per year. Therefore industrialization is a must.

5. Political Conditions: Bayulken said that the anti-US vocal minority in Turkey has faded away although it may continue to exist underground. The attitude toward relations with the US is now better. American naval ships can visit Turkey freely and the Turkish Govt recently made a favorable decision on allowing US destroyers to sail into the Black Sea. Bayulken said that there was a large reservoir of good will toward the US in Turkey. Constitutional reforms will be necessary before Turkey can end its martial law. Bayulken said that the military are anxious to see civilian govt continue. They want to see the threats against democracy staved off, but they don't want to continue indefinitely the current sui generis regime. Bayulken said that Turkey should be able to return to normal democratic govt after the next election providing the electioneering is not too emotional and that there are not too many fiery speeches. Bayulken said that the Melen govt has the sympathy of the Assembly. Nevertheless because of the coming elections the politicians do not want to see this govt be successful. Therefore the PM will have to be very patient. Bayulken emphasized that whether or not elections are held in October 1973 Turkey will hold fast to democracy, its alliances, and its ideals.

6. Security Assistance: Bayulken said that Turkish Assembly has recently approved a 10 year program of armed force modernization which will cost 16 billion TL. This will be a great sacrifice. Turkey will make the ultimate effort but will need cooperation from the US. In this connection Bayulken said that the GOT was very anxious to have last year's \$40 million reduction in MAP replaced. Sisco said that door is not closed but it is unlikely that anything would be done before the election. Bayulken said that Turkey had been promised \$120 million military assistance per year and that he hoped the current figure of \$100 million will not be reduced as it is an absolute minimum. He said

that Turkey would also like to maintain the same level of FMS credit. The Secretary said that the US will do everything it can.

7. M-48 Tanks for Turkey: Bayulken asked about these. Sisco said that this was a matter of administrative detail and that he would look into it. Bayulken pointed out that receiving these tanks is important in order to maintain the confidence of the younger army officers in Turkey.

8. Ship Loans: Bayulken said that it was his understanding that the new clause in the most recent ship loan legislation which prevents sale would only apply to ships loaned to Turkey after its enactment.

9. Northrop F-5 Co-production Project: Bayulken asked that the USG do everything it could to help the Northrop project for the co-production of F-5 aircraft in Turkey. He said that the establishment of an airframe factory would be beneficial to Turkish development. Ambassador Esenbel said that at some point Turkey will need FMS financing for this project. The Secretary said that the US will do everything it could to help.

10. Turkish-Greek Territorial Waters: Bayulken referred to the dispute between the Greeks and the Turks over the joint NATO command in Turkish and Greek territorial waters. The Turks intend to discuss this matter with the Greeks and hope to work out a compromise solution.

11. MBFR Participation: Bayulken said this question was a serious one for his govt. The Secretary said that he understood the Turkish position and we would take a look at it again. The US wanted Turkey to be satisfied and realized the domestic political problems. However it was also important that the talks get underway without hindrance. Bayulken then said that it would be impossible for him to go before his Assembly if the Turkish proposal were turned down. He would have to resign and, perhaps, his govt would have to resign because this is a very important issue in Turkey. He said that the rotational system accepted by 14 NATO countries requires only one extra seat at the talks and that this certainly should not cause any difficulty. He had spoken to Gromyko whom he has known for 22 years and he does not believe the Russians will object. The Secretary said that the US will try to solve this problem and Bayulken reiterated that it was impossible for Turkey to budge on this issue.

12. Poppy Ban: The Secretary thanked Bayulken for Turkey's help on the poppy problem. He said that the Turkish Government had taken a courageous step and this had resulted in great appreciation within the US and that Turkey has clearly taken a leadership position. As a result Turkey is now getting a very good press in the US. Bayulken said that the Melen govt is very serious about maintaining the poppy ban. The GOT told party leaders that it would resign if the ban were rescinded by the Assembly.

458. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Ankara, December 2, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Suleyman Demirel, Former Prime Minister
Ambassador William J. Handley

On Saturday, December 2, I called, at my request, on former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. I had telephoned him earlier to suggest that I would like to have an informal chat with him, and he proposed that we meet at his house. (I had seen him earlier this year, but, since I had been getting some echoes from his friends that he felt he was being neglected, I thought it a good idea to see him, especially since the most recent political crisis had passed.)²

Demirel seemed genuinely glad to see me and was in good form. Our conversation pretty much followed his answers to some questions that, in advance of the meeting, I had thought I wanted to ask him.

I began the discussion with an account of my recent short trip to Iran to a CENTO naval exercise on the Persian Gulf. I mentioned how I continued to be impressed with changes I had seen through the years in Iran as compared with what it was when I first went there as a Labor Attaché in 1945.

I asked Demirel how he sized up the present political situation. He began with a general philosophical response about the problems of democratic government, and in particular of a Turkey which had only recently emerged from a one-party state to something approaching a full democracy. He spoke, as he has in the past, about the dangers to a political democracy of military intervention, making his familiar (and very credible) point that growing political and social institutions are severely damaged by military interventions, and that quite often the

¹ Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 137, POL 2. Secret; Limdis; Noform. Drafted by Handley on December 11. The conversation took place at Demirel's home.

² According to a letter from Dillon to James Spain, November 13, the Department had received intelligence reports indicating that Turkish officers were ready to block Demirel's return to power, arguing that "the U.S. does not particularly like" him. Dillon commented: "I find this disturbing. On the one hand, I think it is important that the U.S. not *embrace* Demirel, thus avoiding giving the impression he is an American puppet. On the other hand, Demirel is the symbol of free democracy in Turkey and it would be a great mistake for us to permit the impression to exist that we would 'approve' his being denied the fruits of an electoral victory by military pressure." (Ibid.) In a November 27 reply, Spain noted that Handley intended to make a call on Demirel prior to returning to the United States. (Ibid.)

shock to these young "plants" is enough to finish them off. He felt that the present situation was especially unusual, since the Government was like a "hermaphrodite." It is, he said, neither male nor female; it is neither a full military intervention nor is it a politically responsible government, i.e., responsible on a party basis to the Parliament.

Demirel added that there was a very good chance that elections would take place on schedule in 1973. All the parties, he said, were for it, and it would be difficult for the military to prevent the elections. But, he added, one can never be sure. Much could happen between now and October 1973, and indeed between now and March 1973 when a new President was due to be elected. He said the military could try to find excuses to disband Parliament and call for a constitutional assembly. It was, therefore, very much a matter of urgency for his party, as well as for the others, to make sure that the reforms pressed by the military should be passed before March 1973. From his standpoint, he would do everything possible to see that these reforms were adopted so that the military could not have this excuse. It was possible, of course, he added, that the military would consider the reforms to be "mini" reforms and unacceptable, but that chance had to be taken.

Demirel spent some time in justifying his stewardship as Prime Minister and in criticizing what the military had done in March of 1971. He said that when they had come to him, criticizing him for not having maintained law and order, he had told them that on three occasions he had arrested the principal anarchists, but that the courts had let them go. Demirel said that as a Prime Minister, as head of the largest party in Turkey, as a political figure, he could not be a judge as well as an executive. It was not his responsibility to "try as well as to charge" the accused anarchists. He asked the military to show him where in any way he had violated the Constitution. He had done this, he said, because in 1960 the military had accused Prime Minister Menderes of violating the Constitution. Rather, he said, he had told the military in March 1971 that it was they who had violated the Constitution.

Following up his comments on the military, I asked Demirel whether, as some Turks had said, the military would veto him as Prime Minister even though he and his party were to win the next election. He said that this would be a major test for Turkish democracy and the "will power" of the Parliament. As Chairman of the Justice Party, he would refuse to permit the military to dictate who should be the Justice Party's choice of the country's next Prime Minister, assuming the Justice Party were to win the election. He stated flatly that the Justice Party would, under those circumstances, take no part in participation in the Government.

I asked Demirel who he thought would be the next President: would it be a civilian or military figure? He pondered this for a while,

but refused to make a specific guess. He said it was far too early to tell who it might be or whom he might support. It was even premature to speculate whether he would be again a military figure or whether some civilian might receive enough support to be elected by the combined Senate and House. He did not think it made too much difference whether the man would come from military or civilian life. It was a question of the man rather than of his professional background. He again referred to the dangers that were facing the Republic even now, and that the months immediately ahead up to March could be dangerous for the future of democracy in Turkey.

To my question about the present state of the RPP,³ he made, I thought, one of his more interesting replies. He said that what was now taking place in the RPP was far more important to Turkish democracy and to the Turkish Republic than what had occurred in March 1971. He said that the RPP, which had been a party of the state and had been the single party that had run Turkey between 1923 and 1950, was getting itself into a position where it might in the future be able to offer the Turkish voter a democratic alternative to the Justice Party. It all depended, he said, on whether or not the RPP would decide to get rid of its previous elitist notions and become a party “of the people.” In the past, he said, the RPP had always attached itself to, and in fact had ridden on the backs of, certain select “institutions” in Turkey. Among these were the army, the courts, the civil service, the universities, and the intelligentsia. This was in many ways nothing but a further application of the Ottoman division of power between the saray, the hodjas and the military. Nothing would please him more than to see the RPP really go to the people, get support from the people, and emerge as a powerful political institution, drawing its strength from a wide people-oriented base, rather than from selected institutions. He attributed to these past practices of the RPP the fact that it is “the courts” who run Turkey today, and that the executive, because of this, had very limited power.

I asked him what he thought of Mr. Inonu and his future role in Turkey. He replied rather carefully to this question, saying that one has to think of the Inonu to whom the Turkish Republic owed gratitude for favors performed a long time ago. But it was Inonu, he said, who more than anyone else had virtually ruined Turkish democracy by pushing the military into the 1960 coup, and he could never forgive nor forget that.

Turning back to the RPP and its future, Demirel said, with some pretension of sincerity, that if the RPP were to win the election in 1973

³ On May 8 Inonu resigned as head of the RPP. Bulent Ecevit won election as his successor on May 14.

on the basis of support "from the people," he could be a happy man. He had always hoped that such a party would some day offer the kind of strong opposition that could challenge his own party. He went on to say that he did not expect, however, that the RPP could win in 1973 no matter what they did, since the Justice Party was enormously strong, but in 1977 they might have a fair chance, and by 1981 they could possibly emerge with the majority of support with the Turkish voter, if, he repeated, they abandoned their traditional role. He said I should never forget that in the days when the RPP was the one party in Turkey the Turkish Parliament was not much more than the "Iran Shah's" Parliament: it was hand picked, non-representative, and in many respects quite meaningless.

I asked Demirel whether he thought elections could take place when martial law was still in effect. He recalled that elections had taken place in 1961, when martial law was in effect. Martial law would still probably be needed in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir during the 1973 elections. It would take some time for the civilian security forces to be rebuilt. Their morale, he said, had been gravely weakened by the action of the military in March 1971 and subsequently. Until such time as the state civilian security forces were once again strong and competent, martial law, in at least those three provinces, would be required. He then added to this list, Diyarbakir since "this is the gateway for Barzani (a Kurdish nationalist) as well as for Palestinian terrorists."

I asked him what would be the aims of his party during the 1973 elections. At this point, he got up and took down a book from his library and handed it to me. It was Corwin's "The President: Office and Powers." As I thumbed through it, he said, "you need not read the whole book; all you need to read is the inscription," and he asked that I read it aloud, which I did. It read as follows, and the attribution was to Secretary of State Seward:

"We elect a King for four years, and give him absolute power, within certain limits, which, after all, he can interpret for himself."

I asked him if this meant that he planned in his platform to urge an increase in the executive powers of the prime minister, and he said very definitely yes. And then he told me that, in October 1970, following the defection of the right-wing members of his party, he had wanted to dismiss Parliament and call for new elections. He was unable to do this, however, because of the constitutional weakness of the executive. He was not exactly sure just how this could be remedied, but the need was clear and he would do whatever he could to increase the authority and discipline of the Prime Minister over the governmental machine. Turkey is still, he repeated, being run "by the courts." Even today, the military courts, he commented, showed themselves nearly as inefficient as their civilian counterparts. For example, there

are people who have been on trial on law and order charges since March of 1971 and have not been convicted or exonerated. Another aspect of his campaign will be to seek the improvement of the quality and speed of justice in Turkey.

Demirel went on to point out that had he had the authority to dismiss Parliament in 1970 he might have succeeded in doing what Indira Gandhi did. He noted that 45 members of his party had defected and set up a new party (the Democratic Party), and that while 65 members of Indira Gandhi's party had defected and set up one of their own with highly respected politicians leading the pack, she had returned to power with an overwhelming majority; and he thought he would have had the same kind of result.

I asked Demirel what he thought of the international situation, and he said he did not want to sound like a McCarthyite, but that he was deeply concerned about the intentions of the Communist world. He said that one should never forget that Communism extends not only over the Soviet Union and China, but includes North Korea, Indo-China, the Baltic States, Central Europe, the Balkans (including Yugoslavia and Albania), has great influence on Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, is probing into Black Africa, controls Cuba, and is trying to affect other Latin American countries, including Chile. It is therefore highly desirable that the democratic world recognize that the threat of Communism remains, although the guise may be different. Those countries in the Western World who believe in democracy should therefore support, wherever they can, their democratic allies and friends. For this reason, he was disturbed that the Western press had been "applauding" what was currently going on in Turkey. He said that the present political situation in Turkey could not be anything else but a setback for democracy, and the press was making a mistake in applauding it. I said that his comment surprised me, since, from what I had seen in the Western press, there had been a great deal of criticism of what had been going on in Turkey, and there had been quite a few references to "a thinly veiled military dictatorship."

Demirel went on to say that he had recently been making speeches about the failure of military regimes in Greece and Pakistan (he has in fact made several speeches in the past month on the subject) and that the military did not like what he had been saying, but he thought it necessary to point out that the Greek colonels were having their difficulties and that Yahya Khan had made a mess of things in Pakistan.

I told Demirel that we had been very pleased with Turkey's decision to ban opium. As I made this point and elaborated on it, he looked at me very carefully and seemed embarrassed by my comment that some members of his party had been trying to rescind the ban so as to permit growth of opium for the purpose of obtaining vegetable oil. He

said that he thought the way the Erim Government had tackled the problem was not the best way, and that it had created a number of complicated problems. But he could assure me—and he spoke very carefully at this point—that he would never permit this issue to affect Turkish-US relations. He would continue, as he has, to keep an eye on the problem. He was interested in seeing what was being done to assist the farmers. And, responding to a supplementary question from me, he did not think that there was any likelihood that the bill would emerge in the near future from the Committee. In any event, he would watch that as well, adding that it was a complicated matter and highly charged politically. He repeated once again his determination not to permit it to become an issue between them and the United States. But, he added, the Government has to avoid “polemics.” Some people, he said, had been charging that he and his party, when they were in power, had done nothing to compensate the farmers in those provinces which had been withdrawn from cultivation when he was Prime Minister. Polemics of this kind could be a “hot wind” which could cause real trouble.

Comment:

The meeting lasted about one and one-half hours and was one of the widest ranging meetings I have had with Demirel in the three and a half years I have known him. He has lost a great deal of weight, seemed even more reflective than I recalled in the past, but continued to show bounce and enthusiasm. He was, as always, an eloquent spokesman on behalf of democracy. His comments on the RPP and its possible future were, I thought, very significant, and from all I could tell he meant what he said. I would have liked him to have been somewhat more categorical about his opposition to any kind of anti-poppy ban action, but my conclusion from what he said and the way he said it was that he will not permit the Justice Party politicians to play havoc with Turkish-US relations for sectional political interests.⁴

⁴ In a December 27 attached memorandum to Sisco and Davies, Dillon recommended that they read this memorandum of conversation, noting “Demirel remains the most important civilian politician in Turkey. . . . I would judge there is a better than 50-50 chance he will once again be prime minister of Turkey.” (Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 137, POL 2)